Facts & Findings



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The UK'S EU Referendum What can the EU do to prevent a Brexit?

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Key points

- The referendum on the UK's possible exit from the EU is primarily a result of the domestic policies and election strategies of the Cameron government.
- The member states and institutions of the EU need to take the British government's demands for reform seriously. An honest and constructive dialogue is vital at this point, as there is a very real danger that the UK may leave the EU.
- Many of the demands coming from the UK are also in the interest of Europe in general and Germany in particular. Only a more efficient and in many aspects lighter EU will be able to accommodate both differing national interests within the EU and the numerous challenges faced both inside and outside of the EU.



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The British government may hold a vote on the UK's future within the EU as early as 2016.

Introduction

In the United Kingdom general election held on 7 May 2015, the Conservative Party with David Cameron as Prime Minister won a small but absolute majority of parliamentary seats. In January 2013, Cameron had announced that in the event of his party's re-election, it would renegotiate the membership of the UK¹ in the European Union (EU), with a referendum on a possible exit of the UK from the EU to be held before the end of 2017.

The paper at hand first discusses why the EU should not disregard the British demand for reforms. Secondly, it outlines the key demands of the UK, and thirdly, it looks at how Germany and the EU may be able to accommodate the UK's demands. Several of the British government's proposed reforms may in fact also be beneficial to Germany and the EU as a whole. At the same time, Germany and the EU will need to ensure that in the upcoming negotiations the EU's fundamental objectives are not compromised through too many concessions to the UK.

Background

When David Cameron announced the in/out EU referendum in January 2013, he was responding not only to widespread euroscepticism within the British population but also the growing popularity of the anti-EU UK Independence Party (UKIP). Cameron was also facing growing pressure from within his own ranks to develop an effective strategy against UKIP. At that time, it still seemed feasible that the EU member states might respond to the European debt crisis by making changes to the European Treaties to reform and deepen the economic and currency union; treaty changes require the agreement of all EU member states. Cameron had hoped that in return for relinquishing his veto power, he could secure special new rights (opt-outs) for the UK. In the meantime, however, both Germany and France have ruled out treaty changes to reform the currency union in the medium term², so Cameron needs to find other solutions in the negotiations with his European partners.

There are growing signs that the British government is pushing to hold its referendum as early as 2016,³ as this will avoid coinciding with the French presidential election in the first half of 2017 and the German Bundestag election in the summer of 2017. Because the French population is also widely eurosceptic, Cameron's prospects for securing individual concessions for the UK will be dim during the lead-up to the French election. In addition, an earlier referendum date will mean a shorter period of uncertainty for the British economy.

Initially, it looked like Cameron scored a success at the end of May 2015 when the UK Referendum Bill received its First Reading in the House of Commons. The proposed format of the referendum was for the voters to answer "yes" or "no" to the question of whether the United Kingdom should remain a member of the European Union. This would have created a strategic advantage for the proponents of EU membership, as their "yes" campaign would have an inherently positive focus. Because of this, the British Electoral Commission decided on 1 September 2015 that the proposed format of the referendum question was biased, and instead recommended to augment the original question with the phrase "or leave the European Union".



Cameron: "Our participation in the single market is the principal reason for our membership of the EU."

Brexit is neither in the best interest of the EU nor the UK.

For Great Britain, the repercussions of an EU exit range from decreased access to the European single market right through to the dissolution of the United Kingdom.

Instead of just "yes" and "no", the possible answers will therefore be "remain a member of the European Union" or "leave the European Union". The eurosceptics also asserted themselves in two other points: Firstly, the referendum vote will be held on the same basis as the House of Commons vote, which means that the around 1.5 million EU citizens living in the UK without a British passport - widely considered to be EU-friendly - will be barred from voting. Secondly, Cameron was forced to reinstate the normal Purdah rules in early September, according to which the entire government has to remain largely neutral for 28 days preceding an election or referendum. This prohibits any announcement or other statement that could influence the outcome of the referendum, as well as the use of any governmental funds or infrastructures for such a purpose. Lastly, Europe's current refugee crisis is posing a dilemma to the prime minister: The more he gives in to the demands of the eurosceptics within his own party and the more he rejects European-based solutions, the more this damages his reputation with other EU leaders whose support he needs for negotiating a more favourable EU deal for the UK.

Why is it important and necessary to reform the EU?

Since the last British in/out referendum in 1975, the former European Community and today's European Union has grown from nine to 28 members, and it has since become much more heterogeneous economically, socially and culturally. Particularly the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties, the European single market and the currency union have fundamentally changed the dynamics between the UK and the EU. In addition, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice have become significantly more powerful over the past decades, and their influence can be felt in daily life in the UK. In his Bloomberg Speech in January 2013, David Cameron stated that "people feel that the EU is now heading for a level of political integration that is far outside Britain's comfort zone." He demanded that the single market should once again become the central idea of the European Union: "Our participation in the single market is the principal reason for our membership of the EU."⁴

Neither the UK nor the EU stand to benefit if the upcoming negotiations fail: Cameron is well aware that economically Great Britain has no viable alternative to the EU, which is its biggest market. As well as facing decreased access to the EU single market, the rules of which the UK would no longer hold sway over,⁵ it would also lose out on the EU's international economic relations⁶ – such as the benefits of the planned TTIP transatlantic trade agreement. An all-round exit from the EU would furthermore take several years to complete due to the complex structure of agreements currently binding the UK, and finding ways to fill the gaps left by the EU membership would also take time. Back home, a Brexit even has the potential to break up the United Kingdom: Should the majority of the UK vote for leaving the EU but Scotland vote for staying, this could give further weight to the Scottish National Party's push for independence and accelerate progress towards another referendum in Scotland (whether driven primarily by a desire to be part of the EU or to be independent is not relevant here).

On the other hand, the EU also needs to work towards holding on to the UK, as a Brexit would come at a significant cost to the EU politically, financially and economically.

Great Britain is the EU's biggest military power and plays an important part in foreign policy and defence, not least because of its special relationship with the United States and its veto power in the UN Security Council. It is the EU's



A Brexit could set a precedent for other countries leaving the FU.

third-largest member state, the fourth-largest net contributor to the EU budget, and responsible for just under 16 percent of the EU-28's GDP.⁷ A British exit from the EU could greatly diminish long-term trust in the European institutions and set a precedent for increased anti-EU rhetoric in other member states as well as further exits.⁸ Without a doubt, the UK leaving the EU would represent a huge political setback for the overall process of European integration.

What are the UK's key demands?

At the last EU summit on 15/16 October, Cameron announced that he would present a list of the UK's (presumably general) demands to the EU in the first half of November as a basis for negotiations to commence in earnest. Judging by recent statements of the prime minister and other government representatives, they seem to envision four main areas of reform, which largely match the agenda set out by the Conservative Party for the general election in May 2015:9

- 1) Free movement of persons: Migration to the UK, particularly of low-skilled Eastern and Southern Europeans, is to be stemmed. Over the past year (May 2014 to May 2015), the total number of migrants to the UK jumped to a record high of 330,000 - three times the target that Cameron had previously promised. Initially, Cameron had aimed to introduce an annual cap for migrants from within the EU; this would have necessitated the existing EU treaties to be modified, as the free movement of persons is a core principle of the EU. The British government then moved away from this demand and focused more specifically on benefit restrictions. Migrants from other EU countries are only to qualify for social benefits after living in the UK for four years. Jobseekers who do not manage to find work within six months are to be denied residence. Similarly, there is to be tighter regulation of EU migrants' families' residence entitlements. The Tory conference held on 6/7 October 2015 showed that there are two distinct groupings in the Conservative Party regarding these demands. Home Secretary Theresa May represents the hardliners: At the party conference, she demanded strict border controls and migrant numbers to be restricted by the British government.
- 2) Competitiveness: Over the past few years, the EU has recorded comparatively low growth on an international scale. In order to protect the British standard of living as well as its sociopolitical institutions such as the National Health Service (NHS), the British government is pushing for more growth stimuli. The European single market is to be bolstered and expanded in areas such as energy, digital activity, and service provision a demand summed up by the catchphrase "better regulation". In addition, there are to be fewer bureaucratic obstructions and more free trade agreements.
- **3) Sovereignty:** Political issues are to be increasingly resolved on a national level again. Traditionally, the UK has always been wary of relinquishing political decision-making processes to Brussels. Because the British government regards the national parliaments of the member states as the only legitimate arbiters of democracy, these are to be given a more active role. For example, the European Commission should be forced to withdraw proposed legislation if national parliaments issue it a "red card", which in effect functions as an early-warning system. Currently, if one third of the national parliaments appeal against legislative proposals of the European Commission, the Commission must review the proposals but is not forced to withdraw them.

Key demands: Restriction of social benefits for EU migrants, stimulation of growth, increased national sovereignty and more rights for non-euro countries.



4) Interests of non-euro countries: Given the wide-ranging moves towards integration within the euro area in the wake of the European debt crisis, the rights of non-euro countries are to be strengthened in respect to the currency union. This is particularly relevant to Europe's biggest financial marketplace, the City of London. Ideally, Cameron also wants to negotiate further British opt-outs, such as when new institutions are created. The British government is also getting increasingly concerned about one of the primary aims defined in the European Treaties, which is to strive for an "ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" (TFEU, preamble). While Cameron wants the single market to be consolidated and (finally) completed, he is not striving for closer political union. In his party conference speech on 7 October 2015 in Manchester, he was again very clear on this point. This means there will also need to be further discussion about the finality of the European Union.

What can Germany and the EU do to meet the UK's demands?

Germany will play a key role during the negotiations of the UK's demands, not least because of its demographic size and economic weight. Furthermore, the UK has traditionally been a close partner to Germany in terms of financial and economic policy, balancing the ordoliberal and social liberal politics of the EU's north against the interventionist politics of the south. There are also numerous other shared interests between the UK and Germany, which is why especially the German government should strive to create favourable conditions for the UK to remain part of the EU.

In June 2015, immediately following his re-election, David Cameron travelled to the Netherlands, France, Poland and Germany, and in early September to Portugal and Spain to present his reform ideas to his fellow EU leaders. ¹⁰ Because of the Greece crisis, President of the European Council Donald Tusk decided to postpone any debate about the British reform plans until the December 2015 summit of the EU leaders. Cameron's aim is to have completed the bulk of negotiations with the EU and its members by then, as this will free him up to promote EU membership to the British population in the first half of 2016.

Germany and its European partners could pursue the following strategies in the negotiations:

1) Free movement of persons: Europe's top political leaders, including Chancellor Merkel, have emphatically rejected any changes to the European Treaties that would restrict the free movement of persons. The UK will therefore only be able to restrict migration from non-EU countries.

To combat "welfare tourism" by EU citizens, London can already draw on several EU regulations for coordinating member states' welfare systems (Nos. 883/2004 and 987/2009), as well as two rulings from the European Court of Justice (November 2014 and September 2015) stating that EU member states are entitled to restrict benefits to unemployed migrants from within the EU.¹¹ Quite rightly, however, Hans-Gert Pöttering (President of the European Parliament, 2007-2009) pointed out in German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on 1 July 2015 that all EU citizens must be treated equally: "Denying social welfare only to workers from specific EU countries violates its rule against discrimination which is a core principle of the EU."¹² Recent developments at the Eurotunnel in Calais/France, where thousands of people are attempting to make their way into the UK, are further heating

Due to its demographic and economic clout, Germany will play a key role during negotiations.



When reforming its asylum and refugee policies in the future, the EU will need to pay closer attention to the UK's concerns.

The EU has already developed numerous mechanisms to make it a more attractive investment location and is currently negotiating several free trade agreements.

up the migration debate in the UK. Although this particular issue is entirely unrelated to EU citizens' right to free movement within the EU, public debate in the UK largely fails to draw this distinction. Even given the British opt-out in Justice and Home Affairs, the EU will need to pay closer attention to London's concerns and demands when reforming its asylum and refugee policies in the future. Already, the EU has approved additional funding for expanding the refugee camps near Calais. In addition, it could contribute financially to the growing joint British-French efforts to combat the gangs of human traffickers. As well as the UK, there are several other EU countries calling for a review of the existing refugee policies on a national and Europe-wide level: Germany, for example, is planning to increasingly replace financial support to asylum seekers with in-kind benefits, which is hoped to reduce the incentive for migration, particularly from the western Balkan states. In a larger context, the EU should be pursuing comparable social standards among its member states; as it stands, the comparatively high social standards of the United Kingdom, 13 Sweden and Germany make these countries particularly attractive as migration destinations.

2) Competitiveness: In its 2015 Work Programme, the European Commission under President Jean-Claude Juncker committed itself to specific stimuli for growth, employment and investment.14 In September 2015, Juncker launched an investment programme planned to attract at least €315 billion of public and private investment into the real economy over the next three years. Other points on the programme are a digital single market for consumers and businesses and a European Energy Union to boost energy production and, in particular, the proportion of renewables in Europe. As well as the speedy and thorough implementation of these projects, the efforts of the British EU Commissioner Jonathan Hill to establish a European Capital Markets Union should also receive further support. Currently, SMEs largely depend on the banking system for their financing needs. More tightly integrated capital markets would make it easier for SMEs to access capital, and also make the European Union more attractive as an investment location. The EU is currently negotiating free trade agreements with a large number of countries, the most publicised being the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States. Similar negotiations are underway with the Mercosur countries in South America, with Japan, Vietnam, Tunisia and Morocco. The CETA trade agreement with Canada has already been completed and is currently under legal review. Increased progress in this area would very much be in the interest of the UK, as trade agreements help boost the services sector and investment both of which, as the eurosceptic think tank Open Europe has also observed, would particularly benefit the UK's economy.15

3) Sovereignty: One of the UK's key demands is the repatriation of sovereign powers from Brussels and a closer integration of the national parliaments. The British government's proposed "red card" system, which would give national parliaments the option of vetoing regulatory proposals from the European Commission, seems feasible. One advantage of such an early-warning system is that it would give each nation's members of parliament a greater role in shaping European politics. Additionally, the European Commission could focus more on directives rather than regulations, as parliaments are given considerable leeway in terms of timescale and content for transposing directives into national law. The division of competences within the EU should also be scrutinised further; strengthening the principle of subsidiarity could help to shift individual competences from a supranational back to a national level. In this context, it would make sense to extend the eight-week period currently allotted to national parliaments for submitting subsidiarity complaints. In any case, the national parliaments should



In the future, the European Commission may need to rely more on guidelines than regulations.

It would be feasible to grant the UK opt-outs when new EU institutions and mechanisms are created. work together more closely and also more competently, and better use should be made of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC).¹⁷ In the words of Jean-Claude Juncker, the EU should be small on small things – i.e., pull back where necessary – and big on big things. The idea of a lighter, more efficient EU is also behind the paradigm shift announced in the European Commission's 2015 Working Programme, where the EU's main role is described as setting priorities and exclusively focusing on major economic and social issues. At the same time, the EU's REFIT programme is already in place to check how well existing EU regulations are working, with the aim of removing unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles and regulations.¹⁸ For the first time, there is now a European Commissioner for Better Regulation, a position held by Frans Timmermans, First Vice-President of the European Commission.

- 4) Interests of non-euro countries: In the face of the current reform and deepening process within the euro area, 19 the divide between the euro area countries and the other EU member states is a real risk. Despite their commitment to an ever closer union', EU leaders have already begun responding to the UK's reservations; in June 2014, the conclusions of the European Council stated "that the concept [...] allows for different paths of integration for different countries, allowing those that want to deepen integration to move ahead, while respecting the wish of those who do not want to deepen any further."20 A special consultation process on proposed decisions could be provided for the non-euro countries. Another possibility would be for the euro area leaders to provide the British government with a legal assurance (UK Protocol) to delete the phrase "ever closer union" from future treaty amendments entirely or limit it to the members of the euro area. It would also be possible to forgo formulations in which the euro is presented as the EU's single currency. In addition, the UK could be given the opportunity of opt-outs for new European institutions and mechanisms in advance. An agreement of this nature the so-called Danish solution²¹ – would accommodate the UK's special wishes and offer the country the option not to participate in steps towards further integration.
- **5) General points:** During the upcoming negotiations, which will most likely be very brief, the EU and its member states should convey to the moderate eurosceptics within the UK's Conservative Party as well as the British public in general that they are similarly interested in improving the EU's existing rules and practices, and that much can be achieved without modifying the EU treaties as such. This could help pave the way for a fair and earnest dialogue about legitimate British demands for reform. In addition to the possibilities outlined above, the EU could also consider extending the so-called UK rebate beyond 2020; this was established to reduce the burden of the UK's financial contribution to the EU budget.

Conclusion and outlook

David Cameron, the EU and its member states have a period of tough negotiations ahead of them if they wish to convince the British population to vote for staying in the EU in the upcoming referendum. For many months, surveys had indicated a stable majority in favour of the UK remaining in the EU.²² Queen Elizabeth II also indirectly advocated an "in" vote during her visit to Germany in late June 2015, describing the possibility of the EU being split up as "dangerous". However, a survey published by research firm Survation on 6 September 2015 indicated a majority of "out" votes for the first time.²³ This is compounded by the fact that Cameron is facing EU opposition on several fronts at home: UKIP is widely promoting an all-out exit from the EU, while the Conservative Party is caving in to



Apprehension about the negative consequences of a Brexit could sway referendum voters to keep the UK in the EU.

The EU is facing a tough balancing act: Holding on to the UK without granting it slimmed-down membership.

the eurosceptics among its own ranks - much to Cameron's displeasure, the party will officially maintain a neutral stance during the referendum campaign. The new leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, is also known to be considerably more eurosceptic than his predecessor, Ed Miliband; when it comes to EU-related matters, he is generally critical and seems to advocate an exit should the EU look like it is neglecting important Labour issues such as employee rights and environmental concerns. Furthermore, UKIP is by no means alone in spearheading the "out" campaign - Business for Britain and The Know.eu are also receiving plenty of media attention with their anti-EU efforts. On the other hand, there are three major factors working in favour of Cameron and the "in" proponents: Firstly, the populations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have more of a pro-European attitude than the English. Secondly, the Scottish independence referendum held in September 2014 demonstrated that many voters are fearful of the political, financial and economic uncertainties associated with exiting a community of states. Apprehension about the negative consequences of a Brexit - also for the stability of the UK's own union – may be decisive in swaying British voters to keep the UK in the EU. Lastly, the third aid package for Greece, agreed on by the euro area countries on 12/13 July 2015, demonstrates the extent to which the European Union will go to not lose one of its members.

Still, it would be ill advised to underestimate the influence exerted by the anti-European voices within the UK media, particularly those coming from the Murdoch empire. Ultimately, an "in" victory in the referendum will only be possible if David Cameron can bring back some actual wins from the negotiating table, and if the EU looks to be an appealing and competent partner at the time of the referendum. Right now, it would seem that the EU's approach to the current refugee crisis will be the dominating theme preceding the referendum. The EU needs to make sure to find solutions here that are also in the UK's interest. On the other hand, the EU member states and institutions also need to ensure that their aim of facilitating different paces of integration for different countries does not lead to a special slimmed-down membership for the UK; this could set a dangerous precedent for other EU members and ultimately endanger the EU's fundamental goal of integration.

Over the past few years, the UK has increasingly withdrawn from decision-making processes on a European level and instead focused on its own domestic policies. However, the EU needs the UK to provide constructive impulses. There needs to be an honest and profound debate about how the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union can be shaped to suit the interests of both.

- 1| The correct full name of the UK is "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland", which comprises England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. For sake of simplicity, "UK", "United Kingdom" and "Great Britain" are used synonymously in this paper.
- 2\ In late May 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande jointly presented a paper on a stepwise consolidation of the euro area that could proceed without renegotiating the Lisbon treaty. Cf. "Ausrichtung der EU: Merkel und Hollande gemeinsam, Cameron einsam", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 May 2015, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/ politik/europaeische-union/merkel-und-hollande-wollen-mehr-integration-der-eurozone-13611827. html [2 September 2015].
- 3\ May 2016 is ruled out already as this is when the UK's local elections will be held. A date in theautumn of 2016 seems most likely at this stage. The full legal framework and a date for the referendum could be in place by the end of 2015.
- 4\ Prime Minister David Cameron discussed the future of the European Union at Bloomberg, Government Digital Service, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg [2 September 2015]
- 5| In the event of an exit, the UK would be relegated to a status much like Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland, who are all part of the European Economic Area but not the European Union. The UK would need to obey the acquis communautaire of the EEA but not be contributing to EU legislation. Rulings such as the Swiss model are not to be offered again in the future.



- 6| There are many differing forecasts about a British exit from the EU. Some studies actually suggest it might result in economic growth and additional jobs, as the UK's economy would no longer be subject to regulation from Brussels. However, the majority of studies predict negative developments for the UK's economy. A joint research paper by the Bertelsmann Stiftung and Munich's ifo Institute, for example, concludes that it could cost the UK more than €300 billion to leave the EU. Cf. "Brexit Mögliche wirtschaftliche Folgen eines britischen EU-Austritts", Bertelsmann Stiftung, Policy Brief No. 2015/05, https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/Policy-Brief-Brexit-de_NW_05_2015.pdf [2 September 2015].
- 7| Figures acc. to Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/de [2 September 2015].
- 8| Cf. Nicolai von Ondarza, "Großbritannien und die EU-Reform Empfehlungen für den Umgang mit den britischen Forderungen an die Europäische Union", SWP Study, February 2014, pp. 8-9, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2014_S04_orz.pdf [2 February 2014].
- 9| Cf. "The 2015 Conservative Party Manifesto", pp. 72-73, https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto [2 September 2015].
- 10| George Osborne, the UK's Chancellor of the Exchequer and one of the two chief negotiators with the EU, will also be promoting the UK's proposed reforms in several of Europe's capitals in the second half of 2015. He has already been to France for talks on 27 July 2015, and on 24 August travelled to Finland, Sweden and Denmark.
- 11 The first ruling concerned a Romanian woman residing in Leipzig/Germany who was taking legal action to obtain Germany's "Hartz IV" unemployment benefit; the German authorities found that she had never seriously attempted to gain employment beforehand. Cf. ECJ of 11 November 2014, C-333/13, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ document.jsf?text=&docid=159442&pageIndex =0&doclang=DE&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1 [2 September 2015]. In the second case, the European judges ruled that job-seeking EU citizens in Germany who had been in employment for less than a year were only entitled to the "Hartz IV" benefit for a period of six months. Cf. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30dd900820c5e8494264 be41b4240b0c3e33.e34KaxiLc3qMb40R ch0SaxuRaN90?text=&docid=167661&pageIndex=0&doclang=DE&mode=Ist&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=389541 [23 September 2015].
- 12| Cf. Hans-Gert Pöttering, "Ein fairer Deal mit Großbritannien", guest article in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 July 2015.
- 13| The comparatively generous welfare system in the UK is evident in the financial and in-kind support that asylum seekers receive while their application is processed they are entitled to approx. €50 per week and free lodgings where required, as well as free access to the National Health Service. As people in the UK are not obliged to be either registered or hold identification documents, it is relatively easy for asylum seekers whose application has been denied to remain there.
- 14| European Commission, "Work Programme 2016", http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/work-programme/index_de.htm [3 September 2015].
- 15| Evaluating 30 potential proposals for EU renegotiation", Open Europe EU Reform Index, http://openeurope.org.uk/intelligence/britain-and-the-eu/open-europe-eu-reform-index/ [2 September 2015].
- 16 Cf. Hans-Gert Pöttering, "Ein fairer Deal mit Großbritannien", guest article in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 July 2015.
- 17| Cf. Céline-Agathe Caro, "More Subsidiarity in Europe but in the Right Place!", KAS Facts and Findings. 143/2014, http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.36756/ [2 September 2015].
- 18 European Commission, "Annex to the Commission Work Programme 2015: A New Start", Strasbourg, 16 December 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2015_refit_actions_en.pdf [3 September 2015].
- 19| Current items of discussion include a European Economic Government, a separate Euro Area Parliament and a separate Euro Area Budget.
- 20| European Council, Conclusions 26/27 June 2014, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ ST-79-2014-INIT/en/pdf [2 September 2015].
- 21| Following a failed referendum on the Maastricht treaty in 1992, Denmark negotiated a number of opt-outs concerning economy, currency and defence policies. These opt-outs were recorded in an internationally binding agreement and then integrated into the existing EU treaties. Cf. European Council, Conclusions 12 December 1992, http://www.euro-parl.europa.eu/summits/edinburgh/b1_de.pdf [2 September 2015].
 The same idea was proposed by Hans-Gert Pöttering in his above-mentioned quest article in
 - The same idea was proposed by Hans-Gert Pöttering in his above-mentioned guest article in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 July 2015.
- 22| According to Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute, 66 percent of respondents in mid-June 2015 were in favour of the UK remaining in the EU, the highest count collected by the institute to date. Cf. Ipsos MORI, "European Union membership trends", https://www.ipsos-mori.com/research-publications/researcharchive/2435/European-Union-membership-trends.aspx [2 September 2015].
- 23| Survation, "Latest Westminster Voting Intention and EU Views, Mail on Sunday Poll", http://survation.com/latest-westminster-voting-intention-and-eu-views-in-survationmail-on-sunday-poll/[8 September 2015].



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