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**Perspectives of Otherness:
Muslims in Europe between
Assimilation and Polarization**

Shiri Relevy



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Introduction

“At the Gates of Vienna...”¹

The issue of the Muslim minorities in different European countries has been central to the European agenda in recent years. In the decades since World War II millions of Muslims have migrated to Europe, legally and illegally, from Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. This mass migration has led to a new reality in which two worlds, sometimes utterly different, have been forced to live together. The Muslim presence in Europe has brought about socio-cultural changes and transformations of the urban landscape; slowly mosques, teahouses, women shrouded in veils etc have appeared. In European public spaces, Islam is regarded as different, as too ‘visible’ and has aroused debates and tension around historical, cultural, religious, political and social issues.²

This tension is related, among other things, to the fact that some immigrant communities choose to maintain the cultural and social characteristics of their countries of origin, an element that poses a challenge to the European lifestyle. Also contributing to this tension are various acts of violence committed by Muslims in Europe and in other parts of the world in recent years, such as the September 11, 2001 terror attack in the United States, the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands later that year, the July 7, 2005 London bombings, the 2005 French riots, the 2005 violent demonstrations across Europe against Denmark and the West in the wake of the Mohammed cartoons controversy, the 2006 London transatlantic aircraft plot, and the 2008 Barcelona Metro bombing plot. The phenomenon of global Islamic terrorism has precipitated the stereotyping of Muslims as a population group that poses a threat to the security and safety of the continent’s non-Muslim inhabitants.³

¹ The phrase “Gates of Vienna” connotes Islam’s arrest by the West, and refers specifically to the point where the Ottoman Empire’s conquests were thwarted in 1683. Raphael Israeli, *The Islamic Challenge in Europe* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2008), pp. 1, 11.

² Jocelyn Cesari, “Islam in European Cities”, in S. Body-Gendrot and M. Martiniello (eds.), *Minorities in European Cities: The Dynamics of Social Integration and Social Exclusion at the Neighbourhood Level* (Warwick, UK: University of Warwick Press, 2002), pp. 88-89.

³ Peter Morey and Amina Yaqin, *Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and Representation after 9/11* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 1-4. See also: Amikam Nachmani, *Europe and Its Muslim Minorities: Aspects of Conflict, Attempts at Accord* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), pp. 43-44; “History of Islamic Militant Attacks in Europe”, *The Telegraph*, July 22, 2011,

Some Europeans regard Muslim immigration as a stick in the wheel of integration and a threat to European culture and uniqueness. Some even assert that Muslims come to Europe to Islamize it. Such prophecies of doom have been heard across Europe and echo the not-so-ancient premonitions of a takeover by another religious minority whose presence challenged the continent's inhabitants: the Jews. For well over a thousand years Jews lived within closed communities as a small yet stable minority among the Christian peoples of Europe, conducting their own cultural, economic and religious life separately from the surrounding populations. The concentrations of Muslim immigrant populations in various European cities today are often reminiscent of the isolated existence of European Jews a century ago.⁴

Some view the concentrations of Muslim communities as a result of their desire to self-segregate and preserve their own ethnic and religious identity. That is, Muslim immigrants are said to establish themselves alongside the existing societies in 'mini-states' or 'parallel societies,' which largely resemble those life frameworks familiar to them from their countries of origin. Spatial segregation based on class, religion, ethnicity or race has been known to exist for hundreds of years in slums, immigrant neighbourhoods, closed communities etc. The quintessential example of spatial segregation of a population is the ghetto, a term that was coined in Venice in 1516 for a delimited and controlled area in which the local Jews were concentrated and economically exploited. Since then there have been other ghettos in different times and places such as the black urban ghettos of the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries, and the Burakumin hamlets in Japan in the 16th century.⁵

While the definition of the term ghetto widened and became blurred over the years, one of its recurrent characteristics has been an asymmetry in balance of power

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/8655451/History-of-Islamic-militant-attacks-in-Europe.html>; Cesari, "Islam in European Cities".

⁴ Oriana Fallaci, *The Rage and the Pride* (New York: Rizzoli, 2002), p. 34: "You don't understand or don't want to understand that a reverse-Crusade is in progress.... A war which they call Jihad. Holy War.... You don't understand or don't want to understand that if we don't oppose them, if we don't defend ourselves, if we don't fight, the Jihad will win". See also: Loïc Wacquant, "What Is a Ghetto? Constructing a Sociological Concept", in N. Smelser and P. Bates (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, rev. ed. (London: Pergamon, 2004), pp. 3-4; Uriyah Shavit, "Old Fear New Threats", *Tchelet*, 2007, pp. 25-27, 38 (Hebrew); Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, p. 10; Nachmani, *Europe*, pp. 46-47.

⁵ Deborah Phillips, "Parallel Lives? Challenging Discourses of British Muslim Self-Segregation", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 2006, 24 (1), p. 28. See also: Amikam Nachmani, "On the Verge of an Open Clash? On Muslim Immigration to Europe", in Amikam Nachmani and Nimrod Goren (eds.), *The Importance of Being European* (Jerusalem: European Forum at the Hebrew University, 2007), pp. 224-225; Wacquant, "What Is a Ghetto?", pp. 1-3.

between the different population groups.⁶ Some scholars argue that while areas in which Muslims live today may not be surrounded by walls, they effectively constitute ghettos or ethnic enclaves as they are in fact not a product of choice by the immigrants themselves but are rather imposed by the indigenous populations of Europe who prefer to avoid contact with the Muslim communities, thus impairing their ability to integrate into the surrounding society.⁷

Through an examination of the question of Muslim immigrants' integration or non-integration into the surrounding societies in various European countries, I aim to assess the ability of European societies to accept 'otherness'. In my view, the otherness of the Muslim immigrants is too fundamental and challenging for 'native' Europeans. Until only a few decades ago, differences between indigenous Europeans were so profound that even peace among them seemed utterly impossible, much less a fraternity of twenty-eight states joined together in a European Union. Accordingly, it is no wonder that European societies have a hard time accepting the Muslims who are living among them as an integral part of their societies today.

It is important to note that despite profound heterogeneity, generalizations are made here with respect to both the European surrounding societies and the Muslim immigrant communities. And yet, individual examples from different countries in Europe and specific Muslim communities are interwoven throughout. Hence, there is no intention here to focus on any particular country or community. Just as the exclusion of European Jews was general and comprehensive, occurring as it did in virtually every country in Europe, in this study the question of integration or non-integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe will be dealt with by examining the comprehensiveness and scope of the phenomenon.

Firstly, I will construct a scale based on models of immigrant integration into receiving societies, relying on the models suggested by F. W. Boal:⁸ full assimilation,

⁶ Wacquant, *ibid.*, p. 3.

⁷ Ron Johnston, James Forrest and Michael Poulsen, "Are There Ethnic Enclaves/Ghettos in English Cities?", *Urban Studies*, 2002, 39 (4), pp. 592-593. See also: Christopher Caldwell, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West* (New York: Doubleday, 2009), p. 120. See also: Phillips, "Parallel Lives?", pp. 27-29; Cesari, "Islam in European Cities", pp. 88, 93.

⁸ F. W. Boal, "From Undivided Cities to Undivided Cities: Assimilation to Ethnic Cleansing", *Housing Studies*, 1999, 14, pp. 585-600.

pluralism and social polarization, combined with the self-segregation model, which Deborah Phillips discusses in the context of the Muslim communities in Europe.⁹

Secondly, I will outline the history of Muslim immigration in Europe: (a) its background and its reasons; (b) the numerical growth of the immigrant communities over time, including statistical data; (c) the dominant notions and state of mind among the Muslim minorities and the majority societies in Europe, in general, towards each other; and (d) the approaches and means undertaken by different governments in Europe to handle Muslim immigration.

Thirdly, I will examine the situation of Muslim communities in Europe today in light of the scale of immigrant integration models, supported by numerous examples from a range of different countries and Muslim communities in Europe, in an attempt to determine which of the models presented most closely reflects the reality of everyday life of the receiving societies and the Muslim minorities in Europe today.

Fourthly, through a comparative discussion of the Jews as the eternal ‘other’ of Europe and the Muslims as the new ‘other’, an analogy being made despite the methodological difficulties it entails, I will try to shed light on the situation of Muslims in Europe today, and to reinforce the argument that indigenous Europeans struggle to accept ‘otherness’. Finally, I will present the conclusions of the study.

However, prior to all of the above, I will present the methodologies employed in this study; discuss the study’s potential contribution to the academic world; establish the idea of examining majority-minority relations between indigenous European societies and Muslim communities today in light of the case of European Jewry; and define the scope and boundaries of the study as well as its limitations.

⁹ Phillips, “Parallel Lives?”, pp. 25-40.

Methodology

The study is based on reading and analyzing academic material, articles and books about the following topics: (a) sociological and geographical theories and models of immigrant integration into receiving societies, along with models of ethnic population concentrations and of ethnic or religious segregation; (b) the history of Muslim immigration to Europe, the difficulties of Muslim immigrants' integration into Europe, as well as Europeans' perceptions and images of the Muslim communities, and vice versa; (c) the history of Christian-Jewish relations in Europe and the Jews' 'otherness' and exclusion from public life in Europe during the first half of the 20th century. The study also makes use of newspaper reports and opinion articles that reflect the state of mind and the great interest in these subjects not only in the research world but also among the general public, in Europe and outside of it.

The subject of Muslim minorities in Europe is one of the most researched. Yet, despite the impressive scope of publications focusing on Muslim immigrant life, the research field dealing with Jews and Muslims is still relatively limited. Articles examining these two population groups have thus far focused on themes such as: (1) a new Muslim anti-Semitism towards Jewish communities in contemporary Europe;¹⁰ (2) comparison of today's Muslim communities to Jewish communities of the 18th and 19th centuries in the context of Diaspora;¹¹ (3) the future of Europe given the challenge the Muslims pose, in contrast to the Jews who never posed any real threat to the continent;¹² or (4) the way in which European Jewish history is used in the contemporary discourse on the relations between indigenous Europeans and immigrant Muslims.¹³

In my view, the analogy to the Jews is necessary when discussing issues of 'otherness' and 'exclusion' in Europe, and when trying to assess Europeans' tolerance of such 'otherness'. The analogy drawn between Jewish 'otherness' at the turn of the

¹⁰ Paul A. Silverstein, "The Context of Antisemitism and Islamophobia in France", Patterns of Prejudice, 2008, 42 (1), pp. 1-26. See also: Matti Bunzl, Between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press/University of Chicago Press, 2007).

¹¹ Sander L. Gilman, "Can the Experience of Diaspora Judaism Serve as a Model for Islam in Today's Multicultural Europe?", in Hillel Schenker and Abu Zayyad Ziad (eds.), Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2006), pp. 59-73.

¹² Shavit, "Old Fear", pp. 25-46.

¹³ Amikam Nachmani, "'The Triangle': Europeans, Muslims, Jews", in Moshe Maoz (ed.), Muslim Attitudes to Jews and Israel: The Ambivalences of Rejection, Antagonism, Tolerance and Cooperation (Eastbourne, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2010), pp. 264-284.

20th century and the ‘otherness’ of Muslims in today’s Europe raises difficult questions, such as: have any real lessons been learned in Europe from the Holocaust? Can citizens of the European Union, which inscribed on its flag slogans such as ‘All Different All Equal’ and ‘United in Diversity’, genuinely accept the Muslims’ ‘otherness’, and what dangers do Europe and its Muslim minorities face if exclusion prevails?

The analogy rests on a number of factors: the claim that Muslims are the new ‘other’, replacing the Jews, who until recently constituted the eternal ‘other’ in Europe; the similarity between Jewish life in Europe, as typified by communities segregated from surrounding societies, whether by force or by choice, and the Muslim population concentrations in today’s Europe; the visible dissimilarities: attire, languages, customs and a diverse ethnic and racial appearance, while the same prophecies of doom heard throughout Europe during the first half of the 20th century, which warned of a Jewish conspiracy to take over the world, are heard today regarding Muslims’ aspirations to conquer Europe and the world and turn them into Dar al-Islam, i.e., territories under Muslim control.¹⁴

Despite the significant similarities, there are some important differences between the two groups as well. Firstly, although both Judaism and Islam are orthopraxic religions, Islam is missionary in nature, and from its very inception declared its aspiration to global conquest.¹⁵ Secondly, while Jews lived among Christians as minority groups for two thousand years, Muslim immigrant communities have lived in Europe for only a few decades; thus perspective is lacking when discussing contemporary Muslim-Christian relations in Europe. Thirdly, the history of Muslim-Christian relations is one of wars and territorial conquests, unlike that of Jews who lived for two thousand years as a persecuted religious minority among the Christian peoples of Europe.¹⁶ And fourthly, whereas there are approximately 1.6 billion Muslims in the world today who make up 23.4% of the global population, with some fifty countries having a Muslim majority, there were only sixteen million Jews the world over on the eve of World War II, constituting a mere 0.8% of the global population without there being even one country with a Jewish majority.¹⁷

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 274-275. See also: Shavit, “Old Fear”, pp. 28-29.

¹⁵ Caldwell, *Reflections*, p. 116. See also: Shavit, *ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁶ Shavit, *ibid.*, p. 34.

¹⁷ Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, p. 1.

The choice of the aforementioned time periods is also significant. The 1930s marked the climax of European anti-Semitism; on the eve of the Holocaust, Jews were excluded from surrounding societies. Correspondingly, since September 11, 2001, Islamophobia has reached an all-time high. If in the 1930s the ‘trigger’ that turned the Jews into a ‘scapegoat’ was their definition as ‘traitors’ in World War I, the events of September 11, 2001, July 5, 2005, and others legitimized defining all Muslims, even if not explicitly, as ‘terrorists’.¹⁸

It should be emphasized that this study makes no pretension of expressing the voice of the Muslim immigrants themselves. Islam has many forms and languages. Although Arabic, in its many dialects, may be the language most closely identified with Islam, it is not the primary language of European Muslims, many of whom speak Urdu, Indonesian, Berber, Turkish and so on, making it difficult to trace the discourse from a Muslim perspective. Additionally, although there are Muslims who research those issues in English and other European languages, since these texts are written in the receiving country's language and not in the authors' mother tongues, we can infer, that they are not directed at a Muslim audience but rather at the Western reader; hence their content tends towards Europocentrism and does not reflect the actual attitudes of most Muslim immigrants in Europe. In other words, this study was conducted from a Western perspective, and when European Muslims' opinions, feelings, desires and perceptions regarding their life in Europe and the surrounding societies are presented, they are based on studies by others – scholars who are conversant in the Muslim immigrants' languages, or have conducted in-depth interviews with them or extensive surveys among Muslim communities – rather than on primary material.

It is also important to note that this study's boundaries are not those of the European Union, for a number of reasons: firstly, the study does not deal with the EU's policy towards Muslim immigration; secondly, accession of any given country to the EU has no effect on the definition of relations between that country and its immigrant communities; and thirdly, this perspective does not shed any additional light on the issue. Furthermore, while most studies of relations between ‘native’ Europeans and Muslim immigrants focus on the United Kingdom, France and

¹⁸ Pew Forum, “The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2033”, *The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life*, 27 January 2011, <http://www.pewforum.org/The-Future-of-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx>. See also: CIA, *World Factbook* (2012) – <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html>; United States Census Bureau, *Historic Estimates of World Population* – http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/worldpop/table_history.php.

Germany, I have not limited myself to those three countries. Such a focus forces one to ignore, for instance, the interesting case of the historically tolerant Dutch society and its attitudes towards its Muslim citizens, or the manner in which welfare states such as Sweden and Denmark have handled the challenges posed by the Muslim presence.

Moreover, limiting the research to specific countries impairs one's ability to assess the scope of the phenomenon and to provide a pan-European picture of relations between the two sides. The approach adopted in this paper generalizes both Europeans and Muslims, each group separately, into a single entity, despite the vast heterogeneity within each group. While such generalization is complex, it enables one to examine the relations between the Muslim communities and the receiving societies in Europe, and the general state of mind among indigenous Europeans regarding Muslim immigrants, covering more than just a few cases unlike most other studies.

Lastly, this study does not examine the level of integration of any of the other minorities in Europe, that is, non-Muslim immigrants such as Chinese, Indians, Latin Americans, Africans and so on. Nor does it observe today's European Jewish communities and their relations with the surrounding societies, or discuss the highly charged issue of Muslim-Jewish relations in contemporary Europe. While these issues are important, they are irrelevant to the present study. I hope that future studies will permit examining these topics as well.

The next section will discuss theories of integration and non-integration of immigrants into receiving societies.

Between Assimilation and Polarization: Models of Integration and Non-Integration of Minorities

“Immigration can enhance strong countries and cultures, but it can overwhelm weak ones.”¹⁹

The degree of integration or non-integration of a minority group into a majority society is assessed according to the level of segregation between the two. The phenomenon of segregation has existed as far back as the ancient cities of Mesopotamia. Throughout history people have found, on every continent and in every society, countless ways of justifying segregation in housing frameworks, whether one a class, tribal, national or religious background or one of income, civilization, ethnicity, race or even gender.

In theory, segregation is a neutral term that refers to an “unequal distribution of a population group over a particular area”,²⁰ and is used to analyze internal spatial variance in urban spaces according to social status, life cycle and ethnic affiliation. However, in effect the term has a negative connotation as segregation is generally associated with discrimination, exclusion and isolation of population groups.²¹

Nevertheless, in some cases segregation can lead to positive outcomes for minority groups as it allows different groups to preserve their identity and culture, reinforces the political voice of group members, and reduces the likelihood of conflict between groups given the lack of contact between them.²² Studies reveal that when immigrants first arrive in receiving countries they tend to live in ethnically segregated areas. This has to do with the fact that, from financial and cultural standpoints, they can only live in these neighbourhoods because they are not yet familiar with the rules of conduct and the language of the receiving society. But it is also because these areas provide them with the social and cultural support system of the surrounding

¹⁹ Caldwell, *Reflections*, p. 21.

²⁰ Gideon Bolt, A. Sule Ozuekren and Deborah Phillips, “Linking Integration and Residential Segregation”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 2010, 36 (2), p. 171.

²¹ Carl H. Nightingale, *Segregation: A Global History of Divided Cities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), pp. 2, 19-20. See also: Joos Droogleever Fortuijn, Sako Musterd and Wim Ostendorf, “International Migration and Ethnic Segregation: Impacts on Urban Areas – Introduction”, *Urban Studies*, 1998, 35 (3), pp 367-368.

²² Ludi Simpson, “Statistics of Racial Segregation: Measures, Evidence and Policy”, *Urban Studies*, 2004, 41 (3), p. 664. See also: Paul Knox and Steven Pinch, *Urban Social Geography: An Introduction*, 4th ed. (New York: Prentice Hall,) 2000, p. 227; Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 135; Nightingale, *ibid.*, pp. 2-3; Bolt et al., “Linking Integration”, pp. 170-171.

community, which is similar to the country of origin – as in such cases as Little Italy or Chinatown in New York.²³

At the same time, some argue that immigrants tend to live in ethnically characterized neighbourhoods because the surrounding ‘white’ society prefers not to share its neighbourhoods with them. Deborah Phillips terms this ‘white segregation’: members of the majority group choose to separate themselves from and avoid contact with ethnic minority groups in neighbourhoods, schools and other public spaces. In other words, the ‘natives’ desert the neighbourhoods which newcomers move into, or avoid settling in neighbourhoods or areas with high concentrations of ethnic minority groups. Yet, while the phenomenon of the ‘white suburb’ is acceptable and legitimate, the population concentrations of Muslim immigrants in Europe are regarded as a problem or as ‘ghettos’.²⁴

According to Loïc Wacquant, the traditional definition of the term ghetto is “a bounded urban ward, a web of group-specific institutions, and a cultural and cognitive constellation (values, mind-set, or mentality) entailing the sociomoral isolation of a stigmatized category as well as the systematic truncation of the life space and life chances of its members.”²⁵ Wacquant expands this definition to include an element of constraint: a population group with a common denominator that is forced to live in a designated territory. Thus, ghettoization is frequently a result of intensifying segregation between majority and minority groups in a society. It is no wonder, then, that scholars researching segregation are increasingly concerned about a possible disintegration of urban society.²⁶

A well-known theoretical model of immigrant integration is the *melting pot*. According to this model, newcomers tend to concentrate in certain urban areas with population groups from the same or similar countries of origin and over time they assimilate economically, culturally and socially into the receiving society, that is, they ‘melt’ into it. These immigrant neighbourhoods provide a familiar environment, a safety net and a support system, while at the same time constituting a ‘bridge’ between the immigrant society and the surrounding society, thus enabling integration and assimilation through a process of learning and socialization, which ultimately

²³ Johnston et al., “Are There Ethnic Enclaves”, pp. 592-593. See also: Simpson, *ibid.*, p. 662.

²⁴ Bolt et al., “Linking Integration”, p. 174. See also: Caldwell, *Reflections*, pp. 122-124; Phillips, “Parallel Lives?”, p. 29.

²⁵ Wacquant, “What Is a Ghetto?”, p. 1.

²⁶ Wacquant, *ibid.*, pp. 2-3. See also: Fortuijn et al., “International Migration”, p. 367; Johnston et al., “Are There Ethnic Enclaves”, p. 595.

leads to social and spatial mobility. Hence, social mobilization occurs and immigrants leave the immigrant neighbourhoods and assimilate into the surrounding society.²⁷

One example of the success of the melting-pot model is that of European newcomers to the United States at the beginning of the 20th century who established colonies in Chicago. These immigrants chose to live in their particular community frameworks out of convenience, solidarity, proximity to sources of income, etc. Over the years they did not perpetuate their difference and the spatial and social isolation that characterized their colonies; instead, after a few generations, they assimilated into the surrounding society, underwent a process of ‘Americanization’, climbed the class and social ladder and the segregated colonies faded as if they had never been.²⁸

However, there are also examples in which the melting-pot model does not achieve the desired results. There is the case of the housing projects built in Europe for underprivileged populations that were meant to extricate them from the slums; these projects’ very location and architecture, however, undermined the residents’ ability to join the labour market and develop a functioning community. When the indigenous Europeans voted with their feet and left these neighbourhoods, newcomers were settled there instead. And when the demand for workers in local industries declined, these areas came to be characterized by high unemployment and slowly deteriorated into ‘lawless zones’: areas with crime rates so high that even security forces would not enter them. Hence, these neighbourhoods not only failed to serve as a bridge for immigrants to the surrounding society but isolated them in unemployment- and crime-ridden neighbourhoods in which indigenous Europeans never set foot.²⁹

According to Johnston, Forrest and Poulsen, the melting-pot model functions as long as processes of economic and social assimilation run parallel and segregation between different population groups is averted. These authors posit four major variables that impact immigrant segregation: (1) the amount of time that has elapsed since first arriving in the receiving country – the more time that has passed, the lesser the concentration; (2) the degree of participation in the labour market – the more assimilated the immigrants are into the labour market and the better their financial situation, the more they tend to move out of neighbourhoods with specific ethnic

²⁷ Wacquant, *ibid.*, pp. 4-5. See also: Johnston et al., *ibid.*, pp. 592-594.

²⁸ Wacquant, *ibid.*

²⁹ Caldwell, *Reflections*, pp. 121-125.

attributes; (3) the immigrants' desire to maintain their particular cultural identity – the more entrenched they are in their identity, the less assimilated they will tend to be; and (4) the attitude of the receiving society – if the society is not interested in absorbing the immigrant group, its integration will not be complete and there will be ramifications for it in the public spaces.³⁰ In other words, the melting-pot model requires the fulfilment of certain conditions without which segregation is liable to occur.

The second model of immigrant absorption is the *multicultural model* or *pluralistic model*, which views society as a mosaic of various cultures, all equal to one another. This model, instead of the majority society dictating values, culture and customs and expecting minority groups to adapt themselves to these, posits a society in which different population groups coexist in full equality. In other words, any preference for one group over another amounts to discrimination, and any attempt to impose the majority culture is regarded as racist. Various Western countries have adopted the multicultural approach in order to allow groups from different cultures to live in an environment of equal opportunity, and to deal with the challenges posed by the melting-pot model. That entails eradicating the intolerance underlying receiving societies' demand that immigrants abandon their culture, give up their particular identity and adapt themselves to those societies.³¹

Since the multicultural approach views each group as distinct, there is no one template of integration. The assumption is that each immigrant group will integrate into society according to its own will, time and context. In that way a pluralistic society will be formed which, in its ideal state, accepts the difference of each of its component parts. Consequently, each person potentially could belong to a number of social, ethnic and cultural circles and the whole of society benefits from the diversity of cultures living within it.³²

Canada, the first country to officially adopt a multicultural policy towards immigrant groups and encode it in its constitution, is an example of a successful pluralistic model. Political participation of immigrants occurs both at the ballot box and in candidacy for political office. Additionally, there is no tendency towards

³⁰ Johnston et al., "Are There Ethnic Enclaves", p. 593.

³¹ Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan* (New York: Encounter Books,) 2007, p. 58. See also: Johnston et al., *ibid.*, pp. 593-595; Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 114; Cesari, "Islam in European Cities", pp. 93-94.

³² Johnston et al., *ibid.*, pp. 593-595. See also: Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, p. 9; Nachmani, *ibid.*, 114; Cesari, *ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

discrimination against candidates from different ethnic backgrounds, and there are fewer prejudices and negative perceptions regarding immigrants in general and Muslims in particular among the Canadian public. Also, compared to other Western democracies, children of immigrants in Canada seem to achieve better results in education.³³

However, the multicultural approach has its shortcomings. Firstly, it allows the receiving countries to effectively ignore their immigrants. Some majority groups tend to avoid involvement in the lives of the minorities, do not help immigrants integrate into existing infrastructures, do not offer them with education in their native languages, nor do they provide for their needs in a way that allows them to practice their customs and maintain their identity in the new environment. Such avoidance can cause immigrants to feel even more excluded in the context of multiculturalism. Secondly, as long as cultural and economic assimilation is postponed, spatial segregation is maintained and enclaves of poverty and low socioeconomic status are liable to form within urban spaces, which serves to perpetuate the subordination of immigrant groups.³⁴

Thirdly, there is also a danger that communities coming from non-liberal cultures will impose their culture on the majority society, or alternatively, will violate human rights of other community members. An example is honour killings, which may be an accepted custom in some countries of origin; hence intervention would entail violating the immigrants' right to practice their customs and imposing the laws of the majority group upon them. However, murder is a criminal offence in all liberal countries.³⁵ In other words, the pluralistic model also poses many challenges for both receiving societies and immigrants.

Another model is that of *self-segregation* or *voluntary segregation*. In such cases, population groups choose to isolate themselves and limit contact with the rest of society in order to preserve their identity or status. Often, voluntary segregation is based on characteristics such as socioeconomic status, lifestyle, ideology etc. Examples are the prestigious districts of Paris, the exclusive upscale suburbs of Boston and other 'gated communities' whose residents belong to the upper classes

³³ Will Kymlicka, "Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future", Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, 2012, pp. 10-11.

³⁴ Nachmani, *Europe*, pp. 114-115. See also: Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, p. 13; Johnston et al., "Are There Ethnic Enclaves", pp. 593-594.

³⁵ Caldwell, *Reflections*, p. 13. See also: Israeli, *ibid.*, pp. 10, 32.

and choose to live separately from the rest of society, in a homogeneous environment with a population similar to them. Usually, these communities are also characterized by ethnic homogeneity.³⁶

The aforementioned ‘white segregation’ or ‘white flight’ phenomenon could lead to another type of self-segregation. When the majority group perceives the immigrants as foreigners invading their space, and fears the repercussions and dangers of this alien presence, the result is that these ‘whites’ choose to leave neighbourhoods where ‘invaders’ now live and move to private, isolated and fortified spaces, protected by security twenty-four hours a day. Unlike other cases of residential segregation, closed neighbourhoods, whose residents are members of the majority group, usually are not regarded as a problem or a threat to society’s structure.³⁷

In some cases self-segregation occurs when a minority group feels threatened by the majority society and chooses to withdraw and isolate itself. For example, Jews in the 19th century chose to go on living in the ghettos even after the longed-for emancipation had occurred, because they offered them protection against the discrimination and hostility they experienced from surrounding societies. Another example is the segregation between the Catholic minority and the Protestant majority in Belfast, Northern Ireland, for purposes of physical protection. However, although in these instances the choice was supposedly made by the minority groups themselves, it may have resulted from external pressures or from difficulties that surrounding societies posed for these minority groups, so one could cast a doubt as to whether it was actually a matter of choice.³⁸ Most likely, voluntary segregation by a minority group does not stem from its own choice but, instead, fulfils a need.

The fourth model occurs when relations between majority and minority groups in society deteriorate into a state of extreme segregation, that is, *social polarization*. In a case of polarization, population groups grow farther and farther apart to the point that a dichotomous distinction forms between them, or at least that is how the groups perceive each other. For example, socioeconomic polarization means that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Social polarization is reflected in social exclusion and extreme residential segregation. The best-known polarized societies in history are the

³⁶ Knox and Pinch, Urban Social Demography, pp. 234-235. See also: Nightingale, Segregation, pp. 9, 398-399; Wacquant, “What Is a Ghetto?”, p. 4.

³⁷ D. Phillips, “Parallel Lives?”, p. 29. See also: Nightingale, ibid.

³⁸ Knox and Pinch, Urban Social Demography.

apartheid regime in South Africa and the Jews and surrounding societies during the Nazi period.³⁹

Exclusion of population groups from public life may also have positive effects, such as increased social cohesion within the excluded community and the establishment of alternative institutions to those of the majority society. An example of such institutional reproduction can be seen in the United States, where Africans who came seeking work after World War I were perceived as so repugnant and inferior that the possibility of them integrating or assimilating into the receiving society was unthinkable. As a result, these newcomers were forced to establish a separate infrastructure of institutions to provide for their needs: schools, churches, newspapers, clubs, civil and political associations etc.⁴⁰

Often, polarization is also manifested in domination of one population group over another. In both the South African and Nazi cases, segregation was enforced by regimes in order to defend the values of dominant groups. The Nazis used the ghettos not only to exclude Jews from common life and public spaces but also to monitor and control them. The element of control is also pronounced in the case of the Jewish ghetto in Venice in the 16th century. The Jews were forced to wear garments that distinguished them from the rest of the population, were permitted to leave the ghetto only during daylight hours, and anyone who violated these rules was severely punished. The Jews had no choice in the matter whatsoever.⁴¹

Thus, ghettos do not emerge out of voluntary segregation. Ghettoization begins where models such as the melting pot or multiculturalism fail, or alternately, were never attempted. Polarization occurs when newcomers arrive in immigrant neighbourhoods, which are supposed to be temporary, and do not find ‘bridges’ to lead them into the receiving societies; when they are denied free access to the labour market, real estate market or equal education; and when they encounter stereotypes, which reinforce their status as outsiders, as others.

To sum up, this section has discussed four models of integration or non-integration of immigrants into receiving societies: beginning with the melting-pot model, which is meant to enable immigrants’ full assimilation into surrounding societies; to the

³⁹ Sako Musterd and Wim Ostendorf, “Segregation, Polarisation and Social Exclusion”, in: Sako Musterd and Wim Ostendorf (eds.), *Urban Segregation and the Welfare State* (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 2-3. See also: Johnston et al., “Are There Ethnic Enclaves”, pp. 594-595.

⁴⁰ Wacquant, “What Is a Ghetto?”, pp. 1-2.

⁴¹ Wacquant, *ibid.*, pp. 2-3, 6. See also: Johnston et al., “Are There Ethnic Enclaves”, p. 594; Bolt et al., “Linking Integration”, pp. 175-176; Musterd and Ostendorf, “Segregation”, p. 8.

pluralist model, which some European countries have adopted in attempting to deal with their immigrants; through the model of voluntary segregation, of which immigrants are sometimes accused; and concluding with the possibility of social polarization. I will now review the history of Muslim immigration to Europe.

Us and Them: The Story of Muslim Immigration to Europe

“And they ill-treated them for no other reason except that they believed in Allah”

(Al-Qur’an 85-8)⁴²

At the end of World War II, Europe was broken, exhausted and lacking in manpower for its recovering economy. In order to cope with the demands of a rejuvenating market, European countries decided to open their gates to cheap and unskilled labour to be employed in black- and blue-collar jobs until the local economy achieved a balance. At first, workers were invited from within Europe, but when these failed to fill the demand, foreign workers were invited from the former colonies of European states.⁴³

The European need for foreign workers is rooted in certain economic factors. Firstly, life expectancy in Europe has increased while the birth rate has decreased; that is, the working population is getting smaller. Secondly, Europeans prefer jobs designated for those who have undergone training and higher education, so a shortage of manual and low-skilled labour emerges. And thirdly, Europeans want to work fewer hours a day and fewer days a week, go on longer vacations and retire earlier. Those who take their places are immigrants.⁴⁴

Immigration may facilitate economic development and market growth. When production forces, consumers, new ideas and knowledge move from one country to another, it leads to economic development, increased demand for goods and public services, labour market expansion, entrepreneurship and improved quality of life. Moreover, immigrants supply a large part of the production output in Europe and the taxes deducted from their salaries pay the pensions of the continent’s aging population; thus immigrants contribute to the economy. However, immigration can also become an economic burden, fostering higher unemployment rates, stress on public infrastructures and the social services etc. Turkish workers in Germany once

⁴² Abdullah Sajid, “Islamophobia: A New Word for an Old Fear”, in: Hillel Schenker and Abu Zayyad Ziad (eds.), *Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2006), p. 1.

⁴³ Chris Hamnett, “Multi-Ethnic London: Migration, Race and Ethnicity”, in: *Unequal City: London in the Global Arena* (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 105, 115. See also: Philip Muus, “International Migration and the European Union: Trends and Consequences”, *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, 9, 2001, p. 31; Caldwell, *Reflections*, pp. 3-4, 27; Nachmani, “On the Verge”, pp. 235-236.

⁴⁴ Nachmani, “The Triangle”, pp. 265-266.

had a higher employment rate than Germans themselves; today as many as 40% are unemployed in various German cities.⁴⁵

In addition to the economic motivations for receiving immigrants in Europe, there are also feelings of guilt and shame for past injustices inflicted by fascism, Nazism and colonialism. Those feelings of guilt over exploitation, torture and oppression of peoples who lived under imperial rule have impelled Europeans to open the continent's gates to immigrants and accept their presence. Tolerance, the absence of which brought Europe to its knees during World War II, became a supreme value in post-war Europe.⁴⁶ All this, along with the fact that some of the inhabitants of the colonies were effectively already citizens of the European countries to which they immigrated, or had prior familiarity with the languages of the receiving countries, acted to encourage their migration to the continent. In the Netherlands, for example, 90% of immigrants were already Dutch citizens before their arrival.⁴⁷

At the outset of the international immigration to Europe, mainly foreign workers arrived, most of them solitary men from the Middle East, North Africa and Asia, supposedly on a temporary basis in order to fill the manpower shortage. The decision where to settle was usually made on a national, but also linguistic, basis in accordance with colonial history: Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to the United Kingdom; Algerians and Tunisians to France and Switzerland; Moroccans to Italy and France; Indonesians to the Netherlands and so on. In the case of Germany, whose colonial past was relatively limited, Turks arrived under the Gastarbeiter (Guest Worker) agreements, which were signed between the two governments to facilitate the country's post-war recovery.⁴⁸

The decision to invite foreign workers was made by the European economic and political elites. Both the foreign workers and the Europeans assumed that this was

⁴⁵ Örn B. Bodvarsson and Hendrik Van den Berg, *The Economics of Immigration: Theory and Policy* (Berlin: Springer, 2009), pp. 3-4, 10. See also: Nachmani, "The Triangle", pp. 255-256; Nachmani, "On the Verge", p. 236; Caldwell, *Reflections*, p. 35; Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, pp. 17-18.

⁴⁶ Yasemin Yildiz, "Governing European Subjects: Tolerance and Guilt in the Discourse of 'Muslim Women'", *Cultural Critique*, 77, 2011, p. 85. See also: Paul Gilroy, "Postcolonialism and Cosmopolitanism: Towards a Worldly Understanding of Fascism and Europe's Colonial Crimes", in: Rosi Braidotti, Patrick Hanafin and Bolette Blaagaard (eds.), *After Cosmopolitanism* (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2013), pp. 112-114; Caldwell, *ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

⁴⁷ Ulbe Bosma, "Introduction: Post-Colonial Immigrants and Identity Formation in the Netherlands", in: Ulbe Bosma (ed.), *Post-Colonial Immigrants and Identity Formation in the Netherlands* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), pp. 7-8. See also: Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, p. 12.

⁴⁸ Robert S. Leiken, *Europe's Angry Muslims: The Revolt of the Second Generation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 106-107, 239. See also: Nachmani, *Europe*, 9; Muus, "International Migration", p. 33.

only a temporary solution.⁴⁹ The foreign workers did not envisage a long-term future in Europe, and therefore did not bother to integrate, did not attempt to learn the language or customs of the receiving countries; instead they continued to live as they had in their countries of origin, importing products and halal foods from them and so on.⁵⁰ Thus, for a long while, they remained no more than foreign guests, temporary inhabitants, neither penetrating the public spheres nor making their presence felt in the European street.⁵¹

And still, the foreign workers encountered negative stereotypes, racism and discrimination. The sense of rejection impelled them even more to be almost invisible, and to seek sympathetic environments and elements familiar to them from their countries of origin. On the one hand, these young men from Europe's former colonies were not given a fair chance to integrate into society; they lacked the tools to acquire the language and learn the European ways of life. On the other hand, they made no attempt to integrate; the language difficulties, the culture shock and the sense of not-belonging only led them to ingather with others like them, other immigrants from their own countries of origin or who shared the same religion.⁵²

Over the years, the European Muslim communities went from invisible to visible primarily due to the substantial increase in their numbers. This growth resulted from two main processes: family reunifications, which brought wives, children and sometimes parents, siblings and other relations to the continent; and natural increase – high birth rates among the Muslim immigrant populations.⁵³

At the beginning of the 1970s, many European countries declared 'family reunification'. Families of foreign workers were permitted to join the men who had immigrated to Europe for work purposes, in the name of the worker's right to a family life. This entailed granting immigration rights to the immigrants' family members. The result was the emergence of stable Muslim communities, composed not only of

⁴⁹ John H. Mollendopf and Jennifer L. Hochschild, "Setting the Context", in: Jennifer L. Hochschild and John H. Mollendopf (eds.), Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives on Immigrants' Political Incorporation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 4. See also: Leiken, ibid., p. 92.

⁵⁰ The term halal refers to what is permitted for use according to sharia, i.e. Islamic law, referring to food and drink but also to other matters. Shavit, "Old Fear", p. 28.

⁵¹ Mollendopf and Hochschild, "Settling the Context", 3-4. See also: Caldwell, Reflections, pp. 3-4; Nachmani, Europe, pp. 9, 139.

⁵² Andreas Jacobs and Maria Elisabeth Rotter, "Elements of Germany's New Islampolitik", in: Reuven Amitai and Amikam Nachmani (eds.), Islam in Europe: Case Studies, Comparisons and Overviews (Jerusalem: European Forum at the Hebrew University, 2007), p. 13. See also: Caldwell, ibid., pp. 30-31, 133-134; Nachmani, ibid., pp. 3, 57-58, 139.

⁵³ Nachmani, ibid., p. 139. See also: Caldwell, ibid., pp. 28-32.

solitary men but of entire families. Children attended school, wives frequented shops and markets. The more the population grew, the more the demand grew for products from the immigrants' countries of origin. Businesses developed to meet the needs, such as shops selling halal products, teahouses and cafes resembling those of the countries of origin, sweets shops for the Ramadan period and so on.⁵⁴

Despite the fact that in the 1970s the European economy reached a saturation point and many countries began closing their doors to foreign workers, the immigration flow did not cease. One reason was the rather lax policy towards refugees and asylum seekers that some European countries adopted, which offered social welfare benefits, residence permits and even citizenship for newcomers.⁵⁵

However, the main reason for the significant growth of the Muslim population in Europe has undoubtedly been high birth rates. The population growth rate among Muslim communities is higher in general, certainly compared to that of indigenous European population, which in most cases has been negative. In other words, the indigenous population in Europe is not reproducing at a rate that allows it to retain its size.⁵⁶

In order to prevent negative population growth, the fertility rate must be at least 2.2 births per woman. As shown by the table below, which is taken from a January 2011 report by the Pew Research Center,⁵⁷ as of 2010 the fertility rate among non-Muslims in Europe was 1.5 births per woman, while among the Muslim population it was 2.2 births per woman.

According to the report, approximately 44 million Muslims live in Europe today, constituting some 6% of the continent's total population. About 4.7 million Muslims live in France, where they make up 7.5% of the total population. In Germany there are 4.1 million Muslims, who constitute 5% of the population, the same percentage as in the United Kingdom, where there are 2.9 million Muslims. In Austria, Switzerland

⁵⁴ Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, pp. 13, 15. See also: Leiken, *Europe's Angry Muslims*, pp. 239-241; Caldwell, *ibid.*, p. 120; Nachmani, *ibid.*, p. 71.

⁵⁵ Israeli, *ibid.*, pp. 12-13. See also: Muus, "International Migration", p. 34; Caldwell, *ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

⁵⁶ On fertility rates for Muslims and non-Muslims, see "The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030", *The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life*, 27 January 2011, <http://www.pewforum.org/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-europe.aspx>. See also: Nachmani, *Europe*, pp. 19, 21.

⁵⁷ *Pew Forum*, *ibid.*

and the Netherlands the Muslim population has reached 5.5%-5.7% of the overall population.⁵⁸

Europe

Fertility Rates for Muslims and Non-Muslims

2005-2010

Countries	Muslim	Non Muslim
Albania	1.9	1.7
Austria	2.4	1.3
Belgium	2.5	1.7
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1.2	1.2
Bulgaria	1.8	1.3
Denmark	2.7	1.8
Finland	3.3	1.8
France	2.8	1.9
Georgia	1.8	1.6
Germany	1.8	1.3
Greece	1.8	1.6
Ireland	3.0	1.9
Italy	1.9	1.4
Kosovo	2.4	1.1
Montenegro	2.5	1.5
Netherlands	2.7	1.6
Norway	3.1	1.8
Republic of Macedonia	1.7	1.3
Romania	1.4	1.3
Serbia	3.1	1.6
Spain	1.6	1.4
Sweden	2.5	1.8
Switzerland	2.4	1.4
Ukraine	1.9	1.5
United Kingdom	3.0	1.8
Avg. for these countries	2.2	1.5

Islam is presently the second largest religion in Europe. The name Muhammad is now the one most commonly given to male infants in Brussels and the United Kingdom. Meanwhile mosques are being built all over Europe, and the number of worshippers in mosques has far surpassed the number of worshippers in churches. As of 2009, there were approximately 150 mosques and some two thousand prayer rooms

⁵⁸ "Muslims in Europe: Country Guide", [BBC](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm), 23 December 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm>. See also: Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 21; Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, p. 17; *Pew Forum*, *ibid*.

without a minaret in Germany, and in the United Kingdom and France there were 1,700 and 1,625, respectively.⁵⁹

The table below gives totals for the Muslim populations of various cities in Europe, and the percentage they constituted of these cities' total populations as of 2008.⁶⁰ In Amsterdam, Muslims made up about 24% of the total population; in Brussels and Marseille the Muslims, constitute 17% and 20% of the population, respectively. Although in London the percentage is lower, the city's Muslim population numbered 625,000 at the time.

Muslim Population in Selected Urban Areas		
City	% of Total	Population
Amsterdam	24.0	180,000
Bradford	16.0	75,000
Birmingham	14.3	143,000
Brussels	17	160,000
Region		
Île de France	10-15	Up to 1.7m
Greater		
London	8.5	625,000
Marseille	20.0	350,000
Rotterdam	13	80,000
Vienna	8	120,000
Sources: EUMAP; <i>The Economist</i> Estimates; UK Census		

In other words, the immigration flow continues, and Muslim birth rates exceed those of non-Muslims on the continent. Hence, as the years go by, the younger segments of the population will include more and more Muslims and fewer and fewer indigenous Europeans. Nevertheless, it is important to note that according to the aforementioned Pew 2011 report, the Muslim population constituted only about 6% of the total population of Europe. This data included countries such as Russia, which has a Muslim population of approximately 16.4 million, and countries with an absolute

⁵⁹ Adrian Michaels, "Muslim Europe: the demographic time bomb transforming our continent", *The Telegraph*, 8 August 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/5994047/Muslim-Europe-the-demographic-time-bomb-transforming-our-continent.html>. See also: Richard Allen Green, "Mohammad Retakes Top Spot in English Baby Names", *CNN*, 14 August 2012, <http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/14/mohammed-retakes-top-spot-in-english-baby-names>. See also: Nachmani, *ibid.*, pp. 21, 121; Caldwell, *Reflections*, 119.

⁶⁰ "When Town Halls Turn to Mecca", *The Economist*, 4 December 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12724966.

majority of Muslims, such as Kosovo and Albania. Yet the Muslim communities are ‘visible’ to Europeans.

The phenomenon of conversion to Islam among Europeans is one of the factors contributing to this sense of ‘visibility’. According to Israeli, around fifty thousand people in both the United Kingdom and France converted to Islam over the course of a decade, including a number of celebrities whose conversion attracted much media interest. Thus, although numerically the phenomenon is relatively marginal, it significantly contributes to the ‘visibility’ of Muslims and increases awareness of the presence of Islam on the continent.⁶¹

Other contributing factors to the raised European cognizance of the Muslim presence in recent years include violent events and riots among different Muslim populations, such as those that broke out in the United Kingdom following the publication of Salman Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses*, in Denmark in response to the *Jyllands-Posten* Mohammed cartoons, and in the suburbs of Paris following an interrogation of immigrant teenagers by the French police, as well as the aforementioned terror attacks perpetrated by Muslim groups.⁶²

Thus, even closing the gates of Europe to labour immigration did not stop the influx of Muslim immigrants. The Muslim population has continued to grow due to (a) family reunification, (b) relatively high Muslim birth rates and (c) the process of conversion to Islam. Thus, the presence of Muslim foreign workers in Europe went from marginal, invisible and temporary to significant, visible and permanent; communities were formed out of families with different customs, languages, clothing and food; Muslim communities that were easily overlooked for decades now became an indisputable fact which could not be ignored.

At the same time, the immigrants slowly realized that they had already struck roots in European soil: they became part of a united community providing for the physical and economic needs of its members, and constructing an infrastructure of educational, welfare and recreational services to fulfil their requirements. Many also realized that returning to their homelands would not ensure a better life than the one they had built for themselves on foreign soil; others had not yet saved the money they hoped to save before returning to their native countries. Thus, despite the Muslims’ economic, social, cultural and geographic marginality in Europe, the myth of return

⁶¹ Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, pp. 17-18.

⁶² Israeli, *ibid.* See also: Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 13.

was shattered, and the realization that they would probably not go back to their homelands began to sink in.⁶³

And yet, these shifts in mindset have not necessarily contributed to the immigrants' integration, and many of them have held onto their particular social and cultural attributes. Even after three generations, there are places where there is virtually no interaction between the receiving society and Muslims living within it. There are neighbourhoods in the United Kingdom that are devoid of English speakers; immigrants who claim they have never met a native European; unemployed Muslim youth in the suburbs of Paris who have nothing to lose and therefore are not afraid to confront the state and its bureaucracy. Today Many Muslims in Europe live in poor suburbs, conduct their lives in their mother tongues and adhere to their own customs in total isolation from local societies.⁶⁴

In the majority of cases direct contact does occur at schools, at work or in the neighbourhood. Such encounters normally allow Muslim immigrants and indigenous Europeans to get to know each other, and help dispel negative images attributed to Muslim immigrants. Nevertheless, the dominant perception of the latter among most Europeans remains quite negative. Encounters with high concentrations of immigrants in a specific geographic location, with the traditional customs and attire, the foreign languages that dominate those areas, arouse feelings of discomfort and fear among Europeans.⁶⁵

Some scholars accuse European majority societies of discriminating against Muslims, arguing that xenophobia is the cause of immigrants' involuntary segregation.⁶⁶ Xenophobia directed at Muslims, or 'Islamophobia', is currently a central research topic. Islamophobia is defined as an ***“unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims”***.⁶⁷

The Runnymede Trust, a British think tank founded by the Commission on Muslims and Islamophobia, posits eight views of Islam that encourage or lead to

⁶³ Tomas Hammer, European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 273-275. See also: Nachmani, *ibid.*, p. 11; Caldwell, Reflections, pp. 31, 120-121, 134-135; Leiken, Europe's Angry Muslims, pp. 92-96.

⁶⁴ Daniel Ben-Simon, "A Week after the Immigrants' Violent Protests: It Is Us or Them", Haaretz, 7 June 2006 (Hebrew). See also: Nachmani, "On the Verge", pp. 229-231; Leiken, *ibid.*, p. 101; Caldwell, *ibid.*, pp. 128-132.

⁶⁵ Talal Asad, "Muslims as a 'Religious Minority' in Europe", in Formation of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 159, 161, 165. See also: Nachmani, *ibid.*, p. 224.

⁶⁶ Asad, *ibid.*, p. 159. See also: D. Phillips, "Parallel Lives?", p. 31; Nachmani, *ibid.*, pp. 224-225, 229.

⁶⁷ Sajid, "Islamophobia", pp. 1-2.

Islamophobia. These involve perceiving Islam as: (1) static and unresponsive; (2) fundamentally different; (3) inferior and primitive; (4) violent and aggressive; and (5) as a political ideology rather than a religion, as well as (6) accepting hostility towards Islam as normal; (7) justifying discrimination towards Muslims; and (8) rejecting any criticism that Muslims may raise.⁶⁸

Islamophobia is also manifested in daily attacks on Muslims in Europe such as imprecations and invectives, smearing lard on Muslims' homes, removing veils of Muslim women, attacking Muslim-owned food stands, vandalizing mosques and Muslim cemeteries etc. One may hear statements such as *"They are watering down the European gene pool"* in reference to Muslims who marry indigenous European women, *"This is the Islamization of our culture"*, *"We are besieged"*, *"It is a Trojan horse"*, *"Europe is committing suicide"* and many others. In addition, right-wing parties in Europe have gained strength while turning the spotlight on Muslim communities and fomenting negative sentiment towards the immigrants.⁶⁹

The "pork soup" affair in France is an example of the abovementioned xenophobia. In the winter of 2003, soup kitchens in Paris, Strasbourg and Nice, which provide food to the homeless, deliberately chose to serve pork soup and pork sausages knowing that both Islamic and Jewish law forbid the consumption of pork. They thereby prevented needy Muslims and Jews from benefiting from the services provided by these kitchens.⁷⁰

By contrast, some argue that European societies are extremely tolerant towards Muslims, while religious minorities in Muslim countries do not enjoy such liberties. *"Postwar Europe was built on an intolerance of intolerance."*⁷¹ This tolerance could explain the scope of the subsequent immigration and the way in which Europeans dealt with immigrants. Indeed, one of the factors drawing immigrants to Europe was the perception that they would be accepted as they were.⁷² In addition, some maintain that Europe is paying too high a price for its tolerance, a price that includes sacrifice of freedoms, violation of civil rights and invasion of privacy, all in the name of

⁶⁸ "Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All", Runnymede Trust, 1997,

<http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/islamophobia.pdf>.

⁶⁹ Asad, "Muslims", pp. 175-176. See also: Shavit, "Old Fear", pp. 25-26; Nachmani, Europe, pp. 46-47, 49-50, 56.

⁷⁰ Gilman, "Can the Experience of Diaspora Judaism Serve as a Model", p. 60. See also: Nachmani, "The Triangle", pp. 275-276.

⁷¹ Caldwell, Reflections, p. 70.

⁷² Caldwell, ibid., pp. 13, 83-86, 111, 114-115. See also: Nachmani, Europe, pp. 41, 47, 53; Israeli, Islamic Challenge, p. 9.

security and protection of the weak.⁷³ Companies and organizations are eliminating traditions of drinking after work; swimming pools are now designating hours for women only; shops, offices and factories are providing prayer rooms; schools are eliminating from the curriculum subjects liable to offend or be sensitive for Muslims such as the Crusades or the Holocaust; toys or calendars with images of pigs or assuming the form of pigs are prohibited in offices, as well as stories or plays featuring pigs in schools and kindergartens.⁷⁴

It is also argued that the differences between Muslim immigrants and receiving societies in Europe are too fundamental. According to Morey and Yaqin, Muslims are perceived as undermining basic Western values: *“Muslims: unenlightened outsiders who...still have an allegiance to values different from those recognized in Europe and North America.... Muslims appear always as a problematic presence, troubling those values of individualism and freedom said to define Western nations.”*⁷⁵ The veil and Muslim women’s traditional attire are perceived as a symbol of the profound cultural gap between Islam and the West. Sander Gilman uses the term “unassimilated minority” to suggest that, no matter what Muslim immigrants do to integrate into the surrounding society, they will never be full-fledged Europeans.⁷⁶ Talal Asad stresses this argument by asserting that *“Muslims are external to the essence of Europe”*.⁷⁷

European Muslims also respond in different ways to the encounter with indigenous Europeans. One phenomenon is the return to ethnicity, to one’s roots. Immigrants feel uncomfortable on foreign soil, alien, not belonging, and this drives them to deepen their ethnicity and highlight it. Those Muslims who arrived in the first waves of immigration, shaven and with Western attire, chose to immigrate to Western countries and live under non-Muslim rule despite the fact that one of the fundamentals of Islam is *“din wa-dawla”* (دين ودولة) – ‘Islam is religion and state’; in most cases these were not particularly religious people. And yet, when finding themselves in new surroundings, they often draw closer to religion. Islam, in its universality, provides a

⁷³ Soeren Kern, “Britain: Muslim ‘Cultural Sensitivity’ Runs Amok”, *Gatestone Institute: International Policy Council*, 20 April 2012, <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3024/britain-muslim-cultural-sensitivity>. See also: Caldwell, *ibid.*, pp. 13, 83-86; Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 41.

⁷⁴ Morey and Yaqin, *Framing Muslims*, p. 1.

⁷⁵ Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of the Veil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 4. See also: Nachmani, *ibid.*, pp. 132, 139.

⁷⁶ Gilman, “Can the Experience of Diaspora Judaism Serve as a Model”, pp. 68, 70-71.

⁷⁷ Asad, “Muslims”, p. 165.

convenient basis to establish a new identity, which enables them to be both European citizens and Muslims at the same time.⁷⁸

The *Ummah* (أمة), the ‘Nation’, provides immigrants with a sense of belonging, helping foster an Islam that does not enjoy state support and is not associated with any specific political group, thus enabling the construction of an identity detached from citizenship. This also applies to many second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants, most of whom were born in European countries, speak the languages and are versed in the local culture, yet still feel unwanted by their native-European neighbours. Moreover, unable to digest the food or cope with the heat, they also feel out of place when visiting their parents’ homelands. Thus, they find themselves excluded at home and foreign in their parents’ countries, and consequently turn to Islam, which provides them the sense of belonging that they seek.⁷⁹

Another Muslim response to the encounter with indigenous Europeans is a sense of disgust towards Western culture. They look at its ills – alcohol and drugs, prostitution, promiscuity, gambling, same-sex relationships, AIDS etc. – and despise it. They regard Western culture – a culture of shopping and piercing, in which the family unit is falling apart, the patriarchal structures are disappearing, and the elderly are forsaken – as devoid of honour and inferior to their own culture. They are far from certain that they want to become Europeans. Consequently, they prefer to distance themselves and their children from this corrupt culture and withdraw further into themselves, avoiding processes of socialization and contact with the surrounding societies.⁸⁰

Alain Finkielkraut, a French Jewish philosopher, argues that Islam played a key role in the 2005 Paris riots as an element of identity. In his view, the Muslim youth, whose entire language is colonialist, do not regard themselves as French; instead they refer to the French as ‘whites’ and to themselves as ‘non-whites’. They isolate themselves from the rest of the population, thus preventing any possibility of assimilation. According to Finkielkraut: ***“The question isn't what is the best model of***

⁷⁸ Nachmani, “On the Verge”, p. 230. See also: Caldwell, *Reflections*, p. 116; Shavit, “Old Fear”, pp. 30-31, 38-39.

⁷⁹ Leiken, *Europe's Angry Muslims*, pp. 101-102. See also: Hammer, *European Immigration Policy*, p. 271; Nachmani, *Europe*, pp. 57, 106, 131; Shavit, “Old Fear”, pp. 32-33, 37-38; Caldwell, *Reflections*, pp. 170-171.

⁸⁰ Caldwell, *ibid.*, p. 19. See also: Nachmani, “On the Verge”, p. 229; Shavit, *ibid.*, p. 34.

*integration, but just what sort of integration can be achieved with people who hate you.*⁸¹

Thus, on the one hand, the dominant perceptions of Muslims among Europeans are not necessarily positive; on the other, Muslims are uncertain they even want to be part of European culture. This situation partly explains the complexity of relations between the two sides. A better understanding of the Muslim communities in Europe also requires examining the political and cultural conditions in the various receiving European countries. Europeans have dealt with international immigration according to three main models.

The first is the ‘guest worker’ model, which generally emerged in countries without an imperialist past or any former colonies from which they could recruit workers, such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden. In these cases, bilateral agreements were signed between governments, one of which was in need of workers for its flourishing economy while the other was unable to provide employment for its citizens. Under these agreements, foreign workers were invited for a designated period of time, usually two years, at the end of which they were to return to their home countries. Indeed, most of the foreign workers went back to their homelands. For example, 75% of the 18.5 million Turks who entered Germany as guest workers between 1960 and 1973 returned to Turkey upon termination of their contracts.⁸²

As far as the governments were concerned, the guest-worker project was not very demanding; they had to provide for these workers only while they were employed in the factories. The surrounding societies in these countries were usually indifferent to the presence of these workers, who were virtually invisible to them. Because of the myth of return – the belief that these workers came to Europe as guests and hence their stay on the continent was only temporary – questions about their integration did not arise at all in the public discourse.⁸³

⁸¹ Dror Mishani and Aurelia Smotriez, “What sort of Frenchmen are they?”, interview with French philosopher Alain Finkelkraut, *Haaretz*, 17 November 2005, <http://www.haaretz.com/what-sort-of-frenchmen-are-they-1.174419>. See also: Caldwell, *ibid.*, pp. 96-97, 142-145.

⁸² Jose Casanova, “Immigration and the New Religious Pluralism: A European Union-United States Comparison”, in: Geoffrey Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood (eds.), *Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 141. See also: Cesari, “Islam in European Cities”, p. 93; Caldwell, *ibid.*, pp. 29-31; Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, *Economics of Immigration*, pp. 404-405.

⁸³ Leiken, *Europe’s Angry Muslims*, pp. 92, 97. See also: Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 139; Caldwell, *ibid.*, p. 29.

The second model according to which Europeans have dealt with international immigration is the concept of full assimilation of immigrants into the receiving society, that is, complete identification of immigrants with the receiving society's language, culture and aspects of identity. This idea was adopted by France and was based on French republican ideology, according to which there is no room for ethnic, religious or racial characteristics in public life. Loyalty is to the state, the French Republic, not to any province, alternative nationality or religion.⁸⁴

For the French, assimilation means establishing similitude between people – if we are the same, we are equal. Thus, censuses in France do not include questions about religion or race. Some view the French law prohibiting veils in public places as an attempt to legislatively create a reality in which Muslims become French in every sense of the word, a reality that neutralizes the differences between groups living in the Republic, even if it involves repressing or ignoring the religious significance of the custom.⁸⁵

In contrast to France, countries such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the countries of Scandinavia and others have adopted the multicultural model, the third model for dealing with immigrants in Europe. As mentioned, this approach allows immigrants to preserve, as a minority group, their particular identities in the context of the receiving society. Thus a society composed of many different groups is formed, a collage of coexisting identities, each one dictating its own character or pace of integration into the majority society, if at all.⁸⁶

Some claim that the multicultural model in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands is based on the political tradition of these countries, which goes back to the days of each one's empire, a tradition that respected different identities and allowed coexistence. Others argue that these countries adopted the multicultural model in order to avoid the task of absorbing immigrants and ensuring their integration into the surrounding societies.⁸⁷

In recent decades and more specifically since September 11, 2001, in light of the violent events and terror attacks enacted by Muslims, various European governments have tried more and more to foster assimilation or integration. Problems arise when

⁸⁴ Leiken, *ibid.*, pp. 58, 108. See also: Nachmani, *ibid.*, p. 58; Cesari, "Islam in European Cities", p. 93.

⁸⁵ Scott, *Politics*, pp. 7-8, 12.

⁸⁶ Nachmani, *ibid.*, p. 114. See also: Cesari, "Islam in European Cities", pp. 93-94.

⁸⁷ Leiken, *Europe's Angry Muslims*, p. 106. See also: Cesari, *ibid.*, p. 94; Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, p. 13.

this is done by legislating prohibitions, mandating citizenship exams and oaths of allegiance or obliging immigrants to speak the local language. Such measures often give the impression of coercion.⁸⁸ It seems that for Europeans, the veil is one of the factors inhibiting the much-yearned-for integration. European countries have promulgated various prohibitions, sometimes anchored in law, on the different head-coverings that Muslim women shroud themselves in – whether the *hijab*, *burqa*, *niqāb* or simple scarf.⁸⁹

In 2009, a law was passed in Switzerland that forbids the construction of minarets, even though there are some 150 mosques and only four minarets in the country.⁹⁰ Demands to prohibit halal slaughter have also been raised in various locations in Europe, based on the claim that it constitutes animal abuse, while Muslims view this as an assault by Europeans on the Islamic way of life.⁹¹ In effect, these laws or bills foment racism against the Muslim communities, intensify discrimination towards them and entrench it in law, but above all, they reflect European societies' fears of the spread of the Muslim population across the continent.⁹²

It comes as no surprise, then, that many Muslims living in Europe still define themselves first as Moroccans, Bangladeshis, or Iraqis and only afterwards as Germans, French, British, Dutch etc. If most of the various indigenous populations in Europe do not view Muslim communities as an integral part of their countries and societies, the division between these population groups run deep and could lead to segregation or even social polarization.

The next section will examine the situation of Muslim communities in different European societies, in light of the above-discussed models of immigrant integration and non-integration.

⁸⁸ Eric Bleich, "State Responses to 'Muslim' Violence: A Comparison of Six West European Countries", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 35 (3), 2009, p. 372. See also: Nachmani, *Europe*, pp. 79-80, 83.

⁸⁹ Nachmani, *ibid.*, pp. 70-71, 139. See also: Scott, *Politics*, pp. 1-2.

⁹⁰ Guy Bechor, "Magic Mountain and the Mosques' Minarets: The Countdown to the Transformation of Switzerland to Lebanon Has Begun", *Gplanet*, April 2010 (Hebrew), http://www.gplanet.co.il/prodetailsamewin.asp?pro_id=1148.

⁹¹ "Halal and Kosher Slaughter 'Must End'", *BBC*, 10 June 2003, <http://goo.gl/1PFsH4>.

⁹² Nachmani, "On the Verge", pp. 224-226. See also: Caldwell, *Reflections*, p. 19; Scott, *Politics*, p. 3.

A Broken Dream: A Look at the Contemporary Relations between Indigenous Europeans and Muslim Immigrants on European Soil

“How can you say you’re excluded, Europeans wondered, when I’m always saying how delicious your baklava is?”⁹³

If there is ethnic or religious segregation in Europe, it is related to a large extent to the phenomenon of international immigration over the past several decades. With the aim of providing a realistic contemporary status report of Europeans’ relations with Muslim immigrants, the following pages will address questions about the success or failure of the multicultural model, as well as claims about Muslim immigrants’ self-isolation and about Europeans’ ability to cope with the heterogeneity that is part and parcel of the globalization era. For these purposes, I will return to the models presented in the first section in order to determine which most accurately reflects the situation in Europe today.

According to the above-discussed melting-pot model, immigrant neighbourhoods provide new immigrants with a support system and security net as they start out; after they learn the local language and way of life, they will inevitably integrate into the surrounding society. And yet, though a policy of assimilation was adopted in France, in practice the banlieues – the suburbs surrounding Paris, Lyon, Lille, Nice and other cities, with their high, grey concrete buildings and total lack of social or recreational centres – create an atmosphere of isolation and segregation.⁹⁴

Architecture can be a factor contributing to the spatial segregation and isolation of Muslim immigrants from the communities surrounding them. In Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, housing projects were typically built rapidly outside the cities in order to meet the housing shortage. Settling the immigrants in these projects, far from city centres and labour markets, impeded or even prevented the immigrants’ economic and social integration into the surrounding societies. The distance from labour markets led to high unemployment rates, and these neighbourhoods became associated with poverty and later also with crime.⁹⁵

⁹³ Caldwell, *Reflections*, pp. 128-129.

⁹⁴ Leiken, *Europe’s Angry Muslims*, pp. 45-46. See also: Wacquant, “What Is a Ghetto?”, p. 5.

⁹⁵ Leiken, *ibid.* See also: Caldwell, *Reflections*, pp. 121-124.

The French banlieues are not very different from these neighbourhoods, and they are called ‘no-go zones’ by indigenous French people. In some of these areas even security forces do not venture, and even the metro and the suburban trains do not stop there. These neighbourhoods were meant to be a bridge for immigrants into surrounding societies, but in reality they are completely severed from them. The immigrant suburbs of Paris are described in terms of profound alienation, even polarization, between indigenous French and the French Muslim communities. The riots that broke out in these suburbs in autumn 2005 only reinforced the view that the melting-pot model had failed to provide the desired results in France.⁹⁶

Of course, there also Muslim immigrants throughout Europe who have assimilated successfully, integrated into European life, but do not receive much public attention or media coverage. However, the general picture of the Muslim communities of Europe is not one of successful assimilation. Amikam Nachmani argues that the melting pot simply does not exist in Europe: “Europe... is not a melting pot in the sense that the US, Canada or Australia are, where migrants drop their former identities in favour of being American or Canadian or Australian, yet preserve many facets of their cultures and religions.”⁹⁷

That being the case, an examination of the pluralistic model in light of European reality is essential now: If a country decides to adopt the multicultural model to define its relations with its immigrants, it must be applied to all aspects of life. Otherwise, even the decision to have an official language of instruction in schools is an affront to ethnic minorities whose language is different from the official one. In other words, if the British take the pluralistic approach, they cannot ask immigrants to pass a test of ‘Britishness’, including mastery of the English language and of the history and culture of the United Kingdom. Multiculturalism means that different groups not only have the right to maintain their particular identity but also that they are not obliged to adopt the language, culture and customs of the majority society. Accordingly, a national proficiency test as a condition for citizenship, as practiced by the British, Dutch, Germans and other nations in Europe, contradicts the basic principles of the multicultural model.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Leiken, *ibid.* See also: Nachmani, “On the Verge”, pp. 230-233.

⁹⁷ Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 115.

⁹⁸ Nachmani, “On the Verge”, p. 226. See also: Gilman, “Can the Experience of Diaspora Judaism Serve as a Model”, pp. 60-61.

In addition, the pluralistic model enables minority groups to abuse values such as equality and freedom of expression, such as cases where Muslim immigrants “...*burn down a Jewish synagogue in Berlin or Paris, they expect their adopted countries to accept that as a matter of course...in order to appear as ‘progressive’ multiculturalists.*”⁹⁹ The multicultural model also collides with the democratic principle of majority rule, since, according to the multicultural approach, minority opinion is equal to that of the majority without distinction.¹⁰⁰ Often multiculturalism comes with a price-tag too high for Western societies: “*Multiculturalism... requires the sacrifice of liberties that natives once thought of as rights*”,¹⁰¹ such as the violation of individual freedom that occurs when surveilling imams and mosques in the name of security, or intervening in family matters in order to prevent oppression of women.¹⁰²

In recent years it seems that Europeans have cast off the illusion of functioning multicultural societies. Both German chancellor Angela Merkel and British prime minister David Cameron have declared, on different occasions, that multiculturalism has failed in Europe.¹⁰³ In 2005, Trevor Phillips, chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality, said that the United Kingdom was “*sleepwalking its way towards segregation*”.¹⁰⁴ Some scholars speak of segregation in various cities in the United Kingdom, and some even define certain neighbourhoods as ghettos.¹⁰⁵ Hence, the multicultural model in its current format has failed to bring about the integration of minority communities into surrounding societies or to prevent deterioration into segregation.

Many indigenous Europeans feel they have made harsh sacrifices and tried to help the Muslim immigrants become equal partners and an integral part of society, but to no avail. They are frustrated with the situation, especially as they believe they were open, welcoming and generous towards the Muslim immigrants: “*Europeans asserted that they were bending over backward to accommodate Islam*”,¹⁰⁶ while the latter

⁹⁹ Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, p. 10.

¹⁰⁰ Caldwell, *Reflections*, p. 13. See also: Asad, “Muslims”, pp. 173-178.

¹⁰¹ Caldwell, *ibid.*

¹⁰² Caldwell, *ibid.*, pp. 13-15. See also: Bleich, “State Responses”, pp. 369-370.

¹⁰³ Nataša Kovačević, “Europe as Host/Hostage”, *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*, 14 (3), 2012, p. 362. See also: Cesari, “Islam in European Cities”, pp. 94, 97; Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, pp. 9-10, 25.

¹⁰⁴ Caldwell, *Reflections*, p. 127.

¹⁰⁵ Johnston et al., “Are There Ethnic Enclaves”, p. 591.

¹⁰⁶ Caldwell, *Reflections*, p. 166.

remained alienated and made no effort to integrate into the surrounding society.¹⁰⁷ These claims raise questions about a possible voluntary segregation of Muslim immigrants in Europe.

“What makes us so certain that Europeanization is a road that immigrants will want to travel?” asks Christopher Caldwell.¹⁰⁸ He cites high divorce rates, internet gambling, anomie and self-loathing as European phenomena that are liable to permeate Muslim communities should they accept the ‘Europeanization’ process. There are Muslims, Caldwell notes, who do not view associating with native Europeans as a privilege, and instead see themselves as morally superior to the materialistic, superficial, atrophied Western society and prefer to minimize contact with it: *“Thus, alienation becomes a self-imposed preference.”*¹⁰⁹

In contrast, Deborah Phillips disputes the claim that Muslims in the United Kingdom choose to create ‘parallel lives’ for themselves and prefer to live separately from the surrounding population; she maintains that it is the indigenous population that chooses to flee concentrations of immigrants rather than the latter choosing isolation. Hence, segregation is more likely to reflect the decision of the ‘white’ or ‘native’ majority rather than a conscious choice on the part of the immigrants themselves: *“Given ethnic inequalities in access to power and resources, the sustained patterns of settlement in deprived inner-city living are more likely to reflect the choices of white, non-Muslim people and institutions.”*¹¹⁰

Adding to the argument that Muslim immigrants in Europe do not opt for self-segregation is the assertion that second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants do indeed have a sense of identification with the societies in which they live and regard the European countries as their homes. They are glad to be able to express their identity, Muslim or otherwise, freely and without fear. They call for Europeans to realize that a ‘Europe of blond children’ no longer exists, and to accept the heterogeneity that characterizes multiethnic societies in the age of globalization. They ask to stop teaching colonialism in schools in order to help eliminate existing stereotypes, and above all they seek to eradicate the negative images and the belief

¹⁰⁷ Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, p. 18.

¹⁰⁸ Caldwell, *Reflections*, p. 19.

¹⁰⁹ Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 57.

¹¹⁰ D. Phillips, “Parallel Lives?”, pp. 29-30.

that Muslims pose a danger to the future of Europe. These appeals indicate a desire to integrate into surrounding societies rather than a desire for isolation.¹¹¹

Thus far we have examined the relations between indigenous Europeans and Muslim immigrants in terms of three out of the four models – the melting pot, multiculturalism and voluntary segregation. As an interim conclusion, the state of these relations appears to be rather grim. Attempts at the assimilation of Muslim minorities in France have led to segregation. European countries that adopted the multicultural model for their Muslim immigrants now lament the idea of pluralism and face issues of segregation; the model of voluntary segregation presupposes the existence of segregation by its very definition.

Even though there are Muslim individuals and groups who have assimilated or integrated into European societies, reality speaks for itself: many Muslims in Europe live in areas segregated from surrounding societies. *“Migrants all over Europe find themselves living in horrendous conditions, in dilapidated shantytowns on the outskirts of Europe’s shiny urban centres or in decaying slum neighbourhoods at the core of mega-cities.”*¹¹²

If looking back at the aforementioned variables that contribute to segregation: time, participation in the labour market, immigrants’ desire to preserve their identity, and the attitude of the receiving society – it appears that in contemporary European reality: (1) immigrant concentrations have not dissipated; (2) over the years Muslim immigrants have been employed less and less in the labour market; (3) although it is difficult to assess the extent to which Muslims wish to retain their particular identities, it seems there is a tendency to return to the arms of Islam; and (4) although there is a wide range of perceptions of the Muslim immigrants among receiving populations, overall it appears that surrounding societies are not very eager to accept Muslim immigrants as equals and to facilitate their integration. It seems, then, that segregation between surrounding societies and Muslim communities in Europe is more or less an established fact.

We must now consider the last of the four models, that is, the possibility of polarization. The terms ‘ghetto’ and ‘ghettoization’ are recurrent in studies of Muslim minorities in Europe, and since ghettos can be an indication of polarization, the issue arouses great concern in academia, politics and the media:

¹¹¹ Nachmani, “On the Verge”, pp. 234-235. See also: D. Phillips, *ibid.*, p. 30.

¹¹² Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 58.

*“The Muslims lived apart in places that were terra incognita to the vast majority of Europeans. In conditions of isolation, many Muslim neighborhoods turned into ghettos, with customs, rules and institutions of their own...the sense that the Muslim part of Europe’s immigrant population was shearing off and forming a parallel society has been at the heart of European worries about Islam since well before September 11, 2001.”*¹¹³

The Montfermeil suburb of Paris is marked by an abundant mixture of different languages; satellite dishes on every roof receiving programs and live updates from the immigrants’ countries of origin; women shrouded in hijabs; halal cuisines and signs prohibiting alcohol sales; youths standing on balconies or in the streets waiting for something to happen. Their chances of getting out of these neighbourhoods and breaking the cycle of unemployment are slim.¹¹⁴ And in other cities in Europe, the situation is not different: *“The introversion and alienation of Muslim migrants in Montfermeil, a suburb of Paris, is not strange to Turks in Berlin, or to Muslims of Kashmiri origin in London.”*¹¹⁵

If the immigrant neighbourhoods are supposed to be a stepping stone to integration, the ghetto deepens the social and cultural gaps between the immigrants and the rest of the population: *“it renders its residents objectively and subjectively more dissimilar from other urban dwellers by submitting them to unique conditionings.”*¹¹⁶ However, the ghettoization process also has to do with one group’s domination of another and the imposition of such segregation. Yet in the majority-minorities relations between indigenous and Muslims in Europe, the segregation more likely results from the indifference of the surrounding societies than from domination or imposition: *“The European host countries are inactive, perhaps even indifferent, forcing Muslim migrants in Europe to re-create patterns of self-preservation from their past lives abroad.”*¹¹⁷

Although the neighbourhoods in which Muslim immigrants live in many European cities are often isolated from the rest of the population, the immigrants are not

¹¹³ Caldwell, *Reflections*, p. 121.

¹¹⁴ Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 117.

¹¹⁵ Nachmani, “On the Verge”, pp. 231-233.

¹¹⁶ Wacquant, “What Is a Ghetto?”, p. 5.

¹¹⁷ Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 11.

imprisoned or forcefully held within them. And while in certain countries in Europe there may be employment discrimination against veiled women, in most cases Muslims are not denied access to the labour or real estate market. However, neither the government nor the surrounding societies provide the immigrants with the tools, means or even the motivation they need to attempt to leave their neighbourhoods and the isolation in which they live.

Essentially, then, the relations between the Muslim communities and the surrounding societies in Europe do not reflect a state of polarization, since there is no domination of one group over another, but rather apathy or avoidance on the part of indigenous Europeans. Therefore immigration, which is supposed to be a tool for social mobilization, does not lead to the desired outcome in the case of the Muslims of Europe, and the result is a segregation that impacts all aspects of immigrants' lives. Their socialization process occurs separately from the surrounding societies; basic education in their neighbourhoods is usually not of the same quality as in other areas of the city; all this creates imparities and ultimately leads to fewer opportunities and greater difficulties entering the labour market.¹¹⁸

In conclusion, it appears that Muslim immigrants tend not to assimilate into the surrounding European societies; the multicultural approach as implemented today has failed to bring about the desired outcomes; and the answer to the question of whether Muslims choose to isolate themselves or, conversely, segregation occurs due to choices made by the surrounding societies, remains unclear. What does emerge from the discussion thus far is that – at this point – there is a certain level of segregation between the two sides; segregation but not polarization. Such segregation could be seen as a failure on the part of minority groups to integrate socially, culturally and economically into receiving societies; however, it could also be seen as a failure on the part of the receiving societies to absorb the immigrants.¹¹⁹

It seems that the encounter between European societies and Muslim immigrants has led to the shattering of two dreams. On one hand, the Muslim immigrants were drawn to a post-war Europe that inscribed values of liberalism and tolerance on its flags; though they hoped Europe's citizens would accept them for who they were, as

¹¹⁸ D. Phillips, "Parallel Lives?", pp. 27-28, 30. See also: Fortuijn et al., "International Migration", pp. 367-369; Johnston et al., "Are There Ethnic Enclaves", p. 591.

¹¹⁹ D. Phillips, *ibid.*, p. 28. See also: Fortuijn et al., *ibid.*, p. 367.

time went on their sense of non-belonging intensified and their dream was crushed.¹²⁰ And on the other hand, the Europeans dreamed of tolerance, wanting to believe that the arrival of immigrants with such different traditions and customs would not impact the social and cultural life on the continent.¹²¹ However, neither of these dreams was realized, and the reality of increasing segregation in Europe today is far from what both Muslims and Europeans wished for.

¹²⁰ Caldwell, Reflections, pp. 167-168. See also: Leiken, Europe's Angry Muslims, p. 101.

¹²¹ Israeli, Islamic Challenge, p. 19. See also: Caldwell, ibid., pp. 13, 111.

‘Otherness’: To Be a Stranger in Europe – Discussion

“Many shades of Muslim religion are all attributes viewed as un-European.”¹²²

Although Islam has been part of the landscape of Western societies for decades, it is still regarded as different and foreign. Muslim minorities in Europe are quite visible: men streaming into mosques, women shrouded in hijabs, niqābs or burqas, muezzin calls to prayer, halal restaurants etc. The Muslim way of life is perceived as a challenge to the Western lifestyle, and the Muslims’ aspirations for public recognition arouse concerns among indigenous Europeans; hence Muslim presence is viewed as a problem in Europe.¹²³

Throughout history, across the world, different societies have felt the need to define themselves vis-à-vis the ‘other’, and sometimes also to isolate this ‘other’ and avoid contact with him or her. It seems that many indigenous Europeans perceive the Muslims living among them as ‘others’: in their appearance – beards and veils, and mosques; in their religious practices – Islam is an orthopraxic religion that affects all aspects of daily life, at a time when secularism has become a new religion for many Europeans; and in the anxiety Europeans feel in the face of Islamic terrorism and threats of global jihad and Muslim domination.¹²⁴ “The Muslim woman, conspicuously dressed in traditional attire, symbolized the development of a new ‘other’ in Europe.”¹²⁵

If one considers the ‘otherness’ of Muslims in light of the eternal ‘otherness’ of the Jews, one finds significant similarities with Jewish characteristics: in appearance – the *tzitzit* (ritual fringes), yarmulkes and other head covers; synagogues; kosher slaughter and dietary restrictions etc. Like Islam, Judaism is an orthopraxic religion that includes daily customs and rituals that are foreign to European societies, which, although secularized, remain Christian at their core. As in the case of the Muslims in contemporary Europe, the Jews too aroused fears among Europeans, along with

¹²² Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 113.

¹²³ Nachmani, *ibid.*, p. 139. See also: Cesari, “Islam in European Cities”, pp. 88-91; Gilman, “Can the Experience of Diaspora Judaism Serve as a Model”, pp. 62, 68, 70-71; Casanova, “Immigration”, pp. 143-145; Nachmani, “On the Verge”, p. 224; Shavit, “Old Fear”, p. 28.

¹²⁴ Nightingale, *Segregation*, pp. 19-20. See also: Nachmani, *Europe*, pp. 36, 139; Shavit, *ibid.*, p. 38.

¹²⁵ Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 139.

numerous prophecies of doom and conspiracy theories about Jewish intentions to take over the world.¹²⁶

In effect, the question “Why the Muslims?” is reminiscent of the question that many scholars have attempted to deal with in the context of World War II and the Holocaust: “*Why the Jews?*”.¹²⁷ It is worth considering some answers that have been given to this question, and whether insights can be drawn that help clarify the situation of Muslims in today’s Europe.

One possible answer is the *ancient religious rivalry between Christianity and Judaism*, given Christianity’s need to justify its existence and gain legitimacy as a ‘new and improved’ religion vis-à-vis Judaism, or due to Christian accusations that the Jews murdered Jesus. In any case, there has also been a rivalry between Muslims and Christians since the very dawn of Islam. Muslim empires stood time and again at the gates of Europe and in various historical periods achieved major conquests on the continent. Additionally, Islam too strove to justify its existence from the outset vis-à-vis Judaism, as well as in relation to Christianity, as a new religion seeking to recruit believers. In other words, inter-religious rivalry between Christianity and Islam has existed throughout history.¹²⁸

Another answer is that Jews served as the Europeans’ ‘scapegoat’. Hence, the Jews were an incidental victim of circumstances: when times were bad and Europeans sought to pin the blame on someone, it fell on the Jews. But now, since the number of Jews in the continent has radically diminished because of the Holocaust and the establishment of the state of Israel, while the number of Muslims is continuously increasing, it is not unthinkable that the latter could become the new ‘scapegoat’ of Europe and be blamed for all its troubles. Accusations are heard about Muslims stealing jobs from indigenous Europeans, exploiting the welfare state, importing conflicts from the Middle East, and about increasing crime rates.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Gilman, “Can the Experience of Diaspora Judaism Serve as a Model”, pp. 59-60. See also: Nachmani, “The Triangle”, pp. 265-267.

¹²⁷ Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 140.

¹²⁸ Jerrold M. Post, “The Psycho-Historical Foundation of Antisemitism”, in: Michael Fineberg, Shimon Samuels and Mark Weitzman (eds.), *Antisemitism: The Generic Hatred* (Middlesex: Vallentine Mitchell, 2007), pp. 90-91. See also: Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, p. 1; Caldwell, *Reflections*, p. 11.

¹²⁹ Hannah Arendt, *The Jewish Writings*, ed. Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), p. xlvi. See also: Israeli, *ibid.*, p. 18; Nachmani, “On the Verge”, p. 225; Nachmani, *Europe*, pp. 10, 47, 113; Caldwell, *ibid.*, pp. 48-50, 152-153.

Another answer to the question “*Why the Jews?*” is the ‘*eternal anti-Semitism*’ of the Europeans, meaning that Jews were hated for being Jews. Accordingly, in Europe today, Islamophobia could replace anti-Semitism or run parallel to it. On top of the incidents already mentioned, the extreme right in Europe, which has always actively promoted anti-Semitism, has become in recent years the flag-bearer of Islamophobia. Politicians such as Jörg Haider in Austria, Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and others in various European countries are promoting strict immigration policies, general xenophobia and more specifically, Islamophobia.¹³⁰

The table below lists extreme right-wing parties in various European countries and the public support they enjoyed as of July 2010.¹³¹

Country	Party	Support
Austria	Freedom Party (FPÖ)	17.5%
Belgium	Flemish Block (VB)	7.8%
Bulgaria	ATAKA	9.4%
France	National Front (FN)	4.3%
Hungary	JOBBIK	16.7%
Poland	SRP	1.5%
Romania	Greater Romania Party (PRM)	3.2%
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS)	5.1%
the Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	15.5%
United Kingdom	British National Party (BNP)	1.9%

The Final Solution, which the Nazis decided upon at Wannsee in 1942, was meant to be the solution to the ‘Jewish question’. The ‘Muslim problem’ is thought to exist in Europe today. If one replaces the word Jewish with the word Muslim in the following quotation from an essay written by Hannah Arendt in the 1930s, it is evident how applicable this quotation is to today’s situation: *“The Jewish question is a genuine question or a genuine problem...wherever truly large masses of people*

¹³⁰ Post, “Psycho-Historical Foundation”, pp. 90-91. See also: Bunzl, Between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, pp. 12-13, 37-40, 46.

¹³¹ Ofer Kenig, “Rising Right: Is the Far Right in Europe Rearing Its Head?”, Israel Democracy Institute, 22 June 2010 (Hebrew), <http://www.idi.org.il>.

reside in the midst of another people from whom they are clearly set off by custom, wardrobe, the monopolization of certain professions and historical development."¹³²

The discussion of the Jewish case is not meant to detract from the case of the Muslims, but rather to emphasize their 'foreignness' or 'otherness', and to reinforce the point that Europeans have a hard time accepting otherness in their midst. The otherness of the Jews was perpetuated in art, literature, children's stories, folktales and so on. Even after their emancipation in the 19th century, and despite their successful integration into intellectual, cultural, economic and political life across Europe, the Jews remained outsiders. Just like the Jews, the Muslims are defined first and foremost by their religious affiliation, unlike Chinese, Brazilians or Indians.¹³³

And yet, despite these significant parallels, it is important to note the differences between the Jewish case during the 1930s and 1940s and that of European Muslims today. Firstly, the Jews did not migrate to the continent but rather were its residents for millennia, and yet were always a foreign element. They were persecuted, banished and slaughtered merely for being Jewish. The Muslims, by contrast, arrived on the continent less than a hundred years ago. Many may suffer exclusion and discrimination, but they are not in danger of expulsion or extermination. Secondly, up until 1948 the Jews had nowhere to go, while the Muslims always have the option of returning to their home countries or seeking their aid if required. And thirdly, notwithstanding the conspiracy theories, the Jews never constituted a real military, political or demographic threat to European societies, unlike Muslim political cells and terrorist organizations that have already left their destructive imprint on the continent.¹³⁴

According to Talal Asad, *"The discourse of European identity is a symptom of anxieties about non-Europeans."*¹³⁵ In his view, European identity was constructed in accordance with the narrative of European civilization, which is based on shared constitutive historical experiences: the Roman Empire, Christianity, the Enlightenment and industrialization. Since the Muslims were not influenced by those experiences, they could never truly be Europeans. They are seen as essentially

¹³² Arendt, *Jewish Writings*, p. 44.

¹³³ Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 140.

¹³⁴ Nachmani, *ibid.*, pp. 142-143. See also: Nachmani, "The Triangle", pp. 274-275, 279-280; Shavit, "Old Fear", pp. 37-39.

¹³⁵ Asad, "Muslims", p. 161.

different, even in dichotomous fashion: as a morally corrupted and violent culture in contrast to the civilized culture of Europe.¹³⁶

Raphael Israeli also describes a dichotomy between Muslims and Europeans:

*Two worlds apart, separated by an unbridgeable cultural gap: one modern, open, tolerant, advanced, meaning well, law abiding, democratic, orderly, eager to live and to let live, oriented to progress and the future, accepting and self-confident to the point of running the risk of self-destruction by generously allowing into itself Muslim elements bent on altering, terrorizing and destroying it; the other narrow-minded, bigoted, jealous, backward, lawless, bent on restoring past glory, intolerant of other and other ideas, tyrannical in rule, unable to accept and include, suspicious and fearing plots, taking shadows of things as the things themselves, vengeful and vindictive, prone to humiliation and shunning exposure to shame, and ready to waive its own life and to take down with it its western enemy.*¹³⁷

Perhaps this dichotomous perspective is the root of the problematic relations between Muslim immigrants and natives in Europe. Amikam Nachmani suggests that ‘native’ Europeans should recall not-so-distant past events instead of perceiving themselves as different and more enlightened and tolerant than the Muslims:

*Contemporary Europeans seem to suffer from an intermittent amnesia when it comes to the religious hatreds, violence and wars that have been part and parcel of their long history. The brutal facets of the Crusaders, the Christian expulsion of Jews and Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula, the Reformation and the Inquisition...even most recently religious conflict has reared its ugly head in the “troubles” of Northern Ireland and the break-up of formerly Communist Yugoslavia...*¹³⁸

At a time when Europe aspires to promote and export values such as tolerance, equality, fraternity, unity, liberality and others, it cannot afford to countenance

¹³⁶ Asad, *ibid.*, pp. 161, 166, 168-169, 171.

¹³⁷ Israeli, *Islamic Challenge*, p. 224.

¹³⁸ Nachmani, *Europe*, p. 39.

phenomena such as unveiling Muslim women, smearing lard on Muslims' homes or refusing employment to people of Muslim background on its own soil.¹³⁹ As Uriya Shavit writes:

*Europe knows how short the distance is between newspaper articles warning against a foreign minority seeping into the roots of the nation and murderous furor against this minority...between exclamations of contempt directed at people in the street simply because their faith and physical appearance are different, and actual pogrom and persecution. The animosity towards Islam and Muslims, in its indiscriminate, blind, patronizing and chauvinistic form, is a phenomenon that Europe must denounce and act to correct, if indeed it has learned anything from its past.*¹⁴⁰

The dichotomous view maintains segregation and impedes integration of immigrants. Therefore, European societies, instead of pointing out the differences between themselves and Muslims, need to find a common ground and make an effort to redefine themselves as heterogeneous immigrant societies while taking into consideration the Muslim presence, with its diversity and uniqueness.

This paper does not seek to rebuke the nations of Europe but, rather, to discuss the possibilities for integrating the Muslim immigrants. According to Bolt, Ozuekren and Phillips, there are three possible reasons for segregation: the strength of the minority community and the relationships between its members; a lack of desire on the minority's part to assimilate into the majority society; and social exclusion.¹⁴¹ In other words, the longed-for integration may be thwarted by separatism as well as by rejection. Among the models discussed earlier, both the melting-pot model and the pluralistic model presuppose that the receiving society is homogeneous and that immigrants know how and into what they are supposed to assimilate or integrate. The other two models – voluntary segregation and polarization – presuppose a state of segregation. Either way, the responsibility for assimilation, or alternately, segregation, falls mainly on the immigrants.

¹³⁹ Caldwell, *Reflections*, pp. 83-84, 300. See also: Nachmani, “The Triangle”, pp. 274-275.

¹⁴⁰ Shavit, “Old Fear”, p. 41.

¹⁴¹ Bolt et al., *ibid.*, p. 170.

Second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants testify that they do not know how to free themselves from being perceived as ‘foreigners’: “We are not foreigners, we are born here, yet we are born with a stamp on our forehead that says ‘foreigner’, that will never go away.”¹⁴² In order for the situation in Europe to change, there must be a reciprocal process and adaptations on the part of both the immigrants and the receiving societies. If the receiving society rejects the immigrant’s attempts at integration, then the immigrant remains rootless in his society of origin and without any anchor in his new society.

¹⁴² Nachmani, Europe, p. 57.

Conclusions

“A vague idea that Europe needs labor coexists with a lack of curiosity about whether migrants are indeed coming to work; a vague idea that migrants need to be cared for as refugees makes it seem impolite to count the cost of assuming responsibility for the world’s poor. To roll out the welcome mat for all these people would be nuts; to turn them away would be racist. Unable to muster the will for either a heartfelt welcome or for earnest self-defense, they hoped the world will mistake their paralysis for hospitality.”¹⁴³

The central question of this study concerns with the ability of Europeans to accept otherness in their midst. In order to tackle this question, firstly, four theoretical models of immigrant integration were presented, from which a scale was constructed. At one end of it was the melting-pot model, that is, full assimilation of immigrants into surrounding societies, and at the other end was polarization between immigrants and receiving societies. Between the two extremes were the multicultural approach, which has been adopted by a number of European countries, and the voluntary or self-segregation model of the Muslim minorities, which, it has been claimed, exists in Europe.

Secondly, the reasons for Muslim immigration to Europe and for Europeans’ invitations were examined. It was also explained who the immigrants were at the outset of international migration to Europe, and how they went from being a marginal and invisible group to conspicuous communities. Also considered were the responses to the immigrants among both the decision-makers and the surrounding societies in Europe, as well as the responses of the Muslim immigrants to their encounter with the native Europeans. All this, in order to provide a sufficient background and explanations for the emergence of a new reality in Europe, a reality of mounting tension between the indigenous populations and the Muslim immigrant communities.

Thirdly, each of the models presented in the first chapter was subjected to a reality test. As was shown, the melting-pot model, implemented mainly in France, failed to bring about assimilation of Muslim immigrants, and thus many of them now live in isolated neighbourhoods, almost completely disconnected from the surrounding

¹⁴³ Caldwell, Reflections, p. 70.

society. Also, countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which adopted the multicultural model to cope with the immigrants' arrival approximately six decades ago, are now lamenting this model and seeking alternative solutions for including and integrating the Muslim populations. The claims about the Muslims' self-segregation were also discredited, as it appears that the choice was actually made by the native majority rather than by the Muslims themselves.

Although some scholars are concerned about the possibility of the situation deteriorating into extreme segregation and even the disintegration of urban society, a number of elements characteristic of polarization seem to be lacking, such as the dominance of the majority group over the minority and the imposition of isolation. The European reality that emerges from this study reflects more than anything else the native Europeans' indifference towards the Muslim immigrants living among them, whether in isolated suburbs on the outskirts of the cities or in neighbourhoods the natives long ago abandoned.

The section on 'otherness' began by establishing that in general, segregation does exist in Europe. In an attempt to understand why there is an issue with the Muslim immigrant population, the question of the Muslims' otherness in Europe was revisited. A comparison was drawn between the Jews, who constituted the 'eternal other' of Europe for thousands of years, and the Muslim immigrants, who seem to be Europe's 'new other'. The discussion showed that whether this is an ancient religious rivalry, a need for a 'scapegoat', or racism per se, the conclusion is the same: the Muslims' otherness – in attire, diet, customs and laws, just like the otherness of the Jews over the centuries – is difficult for the Europeans to accept.

It seems that the more the presence of Muslims in Europe grows – both numerically and visibly – the more indigenous Europeans' fears about the Muslims' otherness increase, and the harder it is for the latter to integrate and become an active part of political, cultural and social life in various European countries. As a result, the interface points between these groups are getting fewer and fewer, and segregation is increasing and threatening to develop into social polarization. Although some radical Muslim groups have territorial ambitions of different kinds or dream of realizing the vision of Dar al-Islam, it seems that most Muslims in Europe simply want to live their lives. It does not follow that prophecies of doom about the dangers awaiting Europe from the Muslim immigrants, such as global takeover, worldwide terror, Islamization or polarization, will materialize.

Some scholars may describe the view presented in this paper as complacent, others may call it naive, since they argue that the Muslims choose to maintain their segregation and are not interested in integrating.¹⁴⁴ If, however, Muslims in Europe were able to live as citizens with equal rights and feel an integral part of the surrounding society, the Islamic element of their identity might not be as important. If the sense of civic belonging offered a sufficient framework for the Muslim immigrants to realize their aspirations for self-determination and to better understand their place in European societies, they would no longer feel the need to deepen and highlight their ethnicity and to differentiate themselves from the societies around them.

If one were to observe the situation of African Americans in the United States. After years of struggles and racism going back centuries, African Americans are slowly becoming equal citizens. Only a few decades ago one could not have imagined that they would fill key positions, and today the president of the United States is of African origin. This has to do with the fact that the definition of citizenship in the United States is liberal, that is, civic citizenship. Hence, any citizen who accepts his civic duties can enjoy the rights he is entitled to as a citizen. In Europe, however, citizenship tends to be based on ethnicity, i.e. ethnic citizenship, which means that the civic affiliation derives from a common ethnic-based identity shared by the citizens.¹⁴⁵

In order to promote real change, Europeans must re-imagine their common identity and redefine the ethnic element of their identity so that it will also include immigrant communities, or alternatively, they must progress towards liberal citizenship where race, culture and ethnic origin have no place. Europeans must understand that contemporary Western societies, in the age of globalization, are heterogeneous immigrant societies unlike the homogeneous national societies that characterized European countries hitherto. They must accept the fact that they need the Muslim immigrants, and that these immigrants are neither guests nor temporary, and are not going anywhere. Above all, they must accept Muslim immigrants as their equals.

¹⁴⁴ Mishani and Smotriez, "What sort of Frenchmen?" See also: Shavit, "Old Fear", p. 40.

¹⁴⁵ Yesmin Huhoglu Soysal, "Changing Citizenship in Europe: Remarks on Postnational Membership and the National State", in: Janet Pink, Gail Lewis and John Clarke (eds.), Rethinking European Welfare (London: Sage, 2001), p. 65.

It is difficult not to be concerned about the fate of Europe when reading about segregation, parallel lives, ethnic enclaves and ghettos in the context of its Muslim populations. The very existence of segregation among different population groups should serve as a wake-up call not only for Europe's policymakers but also for its inhabitants, whatever their origin. Coping with such segregation depends on the ability of European societies to free themselves from their ingrained xenophobia. Just as the European countries managed to overcome the enmity and rivalry between each other and advance towards integration between the nations, they must also eliminate racism and any legal and cultural discriminatory elements. They must educate their children to strive for tolerance, social and cultural heterogeneity and acceptance of the other and the different, and act to abolish the existing painful images of one another, among both Muslim immigrants and native Europeans.

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